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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the major issues of legality that apply to the use of 
military force against non-state actors, how these issues figured in the Norwegian discussion 
and how they influenced the decision-making process before and during our participation in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) until the end of 2002. 
By examining the provisions of international law relevant to armed conflict, in 
particular related to the so-called ―new wars‖, the thesis argues that the use of armed force 
against non-state actors is a matter of some controversy. In particular this alludes to the notion 
of civilians directly participating in hostilities. It argues that in order to apply military force 
against non-state actors, there is a legal requirement to connect those actors to hostilities and 
define the time during which they participate in those hostilities.  
Regarding the Norwegian discussion and decision making process, it argues that 
initially the Kosovo conflict of 1999, but in particular the Norwegian participation in 
Operation Enduring Freedom marked a substantial departure from Norwegian post-Second 
World War traditions with respect to the use of force. This did in turn influence the 
Norwegian discussion on legality by highlighting the implications of using military force 
against non-state actors. 
It concludes that the Norwegian political discussion or decision making process did 
not address the particularities relevant to the use of force against non-state actors in any depth. 
Whereas International Humanitarian Law was frequently addressed in the public discussion 
and by various representatives of the Government, the particularities related to the legality of 
the Afghan conflict remained absent. Governmental statements and parliamentary discussions 
contain, with few exceptions, general references to international law and do not provide 
clarity on the Norwegian position.  
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Introduction 
 
Background 
 
War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all round 
the world -………. Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, 
war as battle between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a 
dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.
1 
As a practitioner of military force, having spent almost a year in Afghanistan, I have 
developed a substantial interest for the legal aspects of contemporary conflicts. The 
background for the writing of this thesis can be found in a long discussion in Norway of 
whether the Afghan conflict, thus Norway‘s participation, constituted a war or not. Arguably, 
war as cognitively recognised in Norway would resemble Rupert Smiths description of the 
war that ―no longer exists‖, i.e. industrialised war between nations‘ armies, requiring the full 
mobilisation of the state‘s resources. Hence, the Norwegian 2WW experience may still be 
considered to shape the public perception of war. However, as Smith rightly points out, such 
wars are exceptions in the contemporary world. Contemporary conflicts are of a different 
kind. They are not between massive armies on a defined battlefield, but between a variety of 
actors, both state and non-state, that oppose each other on a highly fragmented battlefield.  
A major issue in the Norwegian discussion of whether Norway was fighting or 
participating in a war in Afghanistan, was, and indeed is: which rules apply? Which parts of 
IHL are applicable to Norwegian forces operating in Afghanistan? Norway prides itself of 
being highly conscious of International Law and has traditionally accepted every provision, 
treaty or custom, regulating armed forces‘ behaviour in conflict. Arguably, the official 
Norwegian focus on international law raises an expectation that this issue would have a 
predominant position in the decision-making process. However, this thesis aims to show that 
even though the issue of law was widely debated in Norway, neither the discussion nor the 
decision making process addressed the core legal issues relating to the particularities of the 
Afghan conflict.  
A particular issue connected to contemporary conflicts is the presence of non-state 
actors. Such actors play a major role in most contemporary conflicts, but are normally not 
accepted as legal military opponents; they are not entitled to the status of combatancy as are 
members of states regular armed forces. One might suggest that an actor in a conflict is either 
a legitimate military opponent, as described in the Geneva Conventions, or a criminal that will 
                                                 
1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London, Penguin Books, 2005), p.1.   5 
be subject to a criminal investigation through the judicial system. States are generally not 
inclined to grant non-state actors status as combatants or as legitimate military opponents, 
even though a military response (as opposed to the criminal justice model) is frequently 
utilised As will be discussed in this thesis, the legal status of such actors related to their 
participation in an armed conflict is subject to some controversy. The Counter Insurgency 
(COIN) campaign currently going on in Afghanistan exemplifies some of these controversies. 
As will be shown, Norway‘s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was 
in many ways a novel experience. It was the first time since the Second World War that 
Norwegian fighter aircraft were deployed in support of ground operations and with a clear 
probability that their weapons would be used. The particularities of the Afghan conflict thus 
implied that force would most likely be used against non-state actors. The Norwegian 
participation in OEF is of particular interest because it portrays how the small state of Norway 
dealt with controversial issues of international law when actively supporting a major ally in 
conducting an armed conflict. 
Literature review 
This thesis argues that the Norwegian decision to participate in OEF, hence actively support 
the US lead military operations in Afghanistan was not supported by a comprehensive 
discussion of the legal aspects that follows by the particularities of such a conflict.  These 
particularities are deduced from what may generally be described as the Changing Character 
of War and the parts of International Humanitarian Law that deals with the use of force in a 
non-international conflict against non-state actors, typically counter insurgency conflicts. 
Hence, the conceptual background for this thesis is supported by literature that relates mainly 
to two topics; the particularities of contemporary warfare and International Humanitarian 
Law.  
The Changing Character of War 
The so-called Changing Character of War has been widely discussed since the termination of 
the bipolar international system of the Cold War.
 2 In short it alludes to the point that whereas 
war traditionally has been viewed as predominantly an inter-state activity, such wars are now 
exceptions. What has come instead is what several authors describe as ―New Wars‖ that 
differs substantially from the ―Old One‘s‖. The ―Changing Character‖ thus indicates that there 
are particularities with such wars that need to be addressed when states consider engaging in 
an armed conflict. The literature discussed below provide a solid argument for a qualitative 
                                                 
2 E.g: University of Oxford, ―Changing Character of War‖, <http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/ >, accessed 20 August 
2010.   6 
change of the character of war since the end of the Cold War, a possible consequence thereof 
may be that the Law of Armed Conflict may not necessarily fit the contemporary situation.  
In The Utility of Force General Sir Rupert Smith examines whether military force may 
still have utility in contemporary international society.
3 Smith argues that conflict as foreseen 
during the Cold War, labelled interstate industrial war, no longer exists. Conflict has, 
according to Smith, been fragmented by a variety of factors, most notably; the actors that 
participate, the reasons for fighting, the way in which they fight and the way they are 
organised. Smith, especially in the last part of his book, emphasises his own experiences from 
the Kosovo conflict. He makes a strong argument that most contemporary conflicts are guided 
by a different logic than interstate war. Smith labels contemporary wars as ―war amongst the 
people‖. It is no longer armies facing each other on the battlefield, but rather violent conflicts 
that, for a number of reasons, occur in the midst of inhabited areas. This way of approaching 
conflict will obviously have consequences. It may, or even should, influence the training and 
equipping of military forces, but also raises important questions regarding the legitimacy and 
legality of the use of force. A possible weakness with Smith‘s approach may be that he 
generalise too much based on his Kosovo experience. The Kosovo conflict was, like most 
conflicts, unique, and the experiences from this conflict may be difficult to apply generally 
throughout the world. Smith‘s almost total rejection of traditional interstate war as a 
possibility may also be questionable.  
The Israeli military historian and theorist Martin Van Creveld has written extensively on 
issues of contemporary conflict and military development. In his classical book The 
Transformation of War he rejects the idea of Clausewitzian Trinitarian war as a viable 
concept for understanding contemporary conflicts.
4 Van Creveld argues that contemporary 
conflicts are mainly about the following issues: 
  By whom war is fought - whether by states or by non-state actors.  
  What war is about - the relationships between the actors, and between them and the 
non-combatants.  
  How war is fought - issues of strategy and tactics.  
  What war is fought for - whether to enhance national power, or as an end in itself.  
  Why war is fought - the motivations of the individual soldier.  
                                                 
3 Smith, The Utility of Force. (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
4 Martin Van Creveld, The transformation of War, (New York : Free Press, 1991).   7 
Van Creveld argues that the character of war has changed and that non-state actors play a 
highly important role in contemporary conflicts. In The Transformation of War and also in 
later works, Van Creveld indicates that the concept of nation states and state sovereignty has 
fragmented, and that powerful non-state actors will be the most likely opponent of any army 
in the future. He further indicates that the public, but also the military understanding of war, 
predominantly rests on the Clausewitzian concept of Trinitarian war. By making these 
suggestions, Van Creveld questions the contemporary concept of war, which he claims is 
based on the Clausewitzian approach, and argues that this is false. He argues that military 
forces need to adjust accordingly in order to be able to handle such conflicts, stating that the 
need for heavy equipment and large military formations may be replaced by constabulary-
type forces that operate in the rather unclear area between military operations and law 
enforcement. Van Creveld‘s arguments are not undisputed. The decline of the nation state and 
the fragmentation of the principle of state sovereignty are not highly obvious. In the 
foreseeable future, sovereign states still seem to be the most potent players in the international 
society. Most states also seem to keep and utilise heavy military equipment in their 
inventories, as the Afghan conflict clearly shows. Still, arguably Van Creveld has made major 
contributions to the understanding of contemporary conflicts, and his work is used by various 
military academies teaching military theory.  
In The State, War and The State of War Kalevi Holsti argues that war in most cases 
cannot be understood as an instrument of pursuing state interest.
5 According to Holsti, war 
will, or indeed has, developed into what he calls ―Wars of a Third Kind‖. He argues that, 
whereas until the end of the Second World War interstate war was the rule, this is now the 
exception. Most wars occur within states between various actors, both state and non-state, for 
reasons not easily contained within Clausewitz‘ political concept. Holsti refers to Martin Van 
Creveld in stating: 
The Clausewitzian eighteenth- and nineteenth century concept of war … is not only 
fast fading, but inappropriate as both an analytical and policy guide to those who must 
think and response to violence that concerns ideology and/or the nature of 
communities, rather than state interest.
6  
In Wars of a Third Kind, Hosti claims; ―just as civilian/soldier distinction disappears, 
the role of outsiders becomes fuzzy. The laws of neutrality no longer apply because those who 
                                                 
5 Kalevi Holsti, The State, War and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
6 Ibid p.37.   8 
are weak rely on outsiders for arms, logistical support and sanctuary‖
7 These wars are 
people‘s wars and their nature is not political, as traditionally understood.  
…the purposes of such wars are often to politicize the masses, to turn them into good 
revolutionaries and/or nationalists. Civilians not only become major targets of 
operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major 
purpose of war.
8  
He argues that there are several differences between such wars and institutionalised or 
total war. Whereas war fought within the Napoleonic paradigm can be looked upon as a 
continuation of state policy to pursue state interests, this connection is not obvious in Wars of 
a Third Kind. Holsti argues that; ―War as an instrument of foreign policy with limited goals is 
not necessarily the same phenomenon as war fought to preserve or establish a community‖.
9 
In Wars of a Third Kind, the actors are not exclusively states. Whereas the traditional 
concept of war implies a conflict situation between states, this seems to be the exception in 
contemporary conflicts. History has, for example, through the wars of decolonisation and the 
activities of organisations like the IRA, ETA and PLO, produced a variety of non-state actors 
with political agendas who were willing to use force to obtain their objectives. 
Holsti argues that Wars of a Third Kind will be the standard of future conflict. They 
must be understood within the framework of the weakening of (some) states, globalisation, 
ethnic and religious tension and quest for influence and resources. They occur, as Rupert 
Smith would have put it, ―amongst the people‖ and state actors represented by regular military 
forces are only some of a range of actors.  
The notion of a qualitative change in the character of war may also be found in the 
concept of 4
th Generation Warfare (4GW). 4GW was first examined by LtCol William S Lind 
in a Marine Corps Gazette paper in 1989.
10 Lind argues that modern warfare has developed 
through four generations, initiated by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the introduction of 
the state monopoly of violence.
11 In brief, the four generations of warfare are recognised by 
the following:  
                                                 
7 Kalevi Holsti, The State, War and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.37. 
8 Ibid, p.39. 
9 Ibid, p.38. 
10 William S Lind et al, The Changing Face of War, Into the Fourth Generation, (Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 
1989), pp.22-26. 
11 William S Lind, Understanding Fourth generation Warfare, http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702, 
accessed 23 August 2010.   9 
1)  the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form 
of insurgency that employs all available networks—political, economic, social, military—
to convince an opponent's decision makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly.
12  
Lind argues that both the termination of the bipolar international system, but also 
technological and societal changes are factors that have moved the character of war into the 
Fourth Generation. The Fourth generation is characterised by a partly collapse in the state 
monopoly of violence, the introduction of powerful non-state actors and not least 
unconventional ways of fighting, e.g. the use suicide bombers and other means of terrorism.
13 
As such Lind‘s analysis do not differ substantially from those of Creveld‘s and Holsti‘s. 
Common to analysis focusing on 4GW is the perception of a change in the character of 
conflict since the termination of the Cold War. However, whereas Lind‘s and Hammes‘ 
examination of contemporary conflicts contains highly useful analysis, the notion of four 
generations starting with the 1648 peace in Westphalia are according to Timothy J. Junio; 
―logically and temporarily inconsistent‖ and provides limited basis for understanding the 
development of war as such.
14 Even more critical to the concept of 4GW is Dr. Antulio J. 
Echevarria II‘s in Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths.
15 In particular, Echevarria 
denounces the idea of four generations of war, and, although accepting that 4GW proponents 
may present useful analysis of contemporary conflicts, argue that the concept itself carry 
highly limited if any utility, and as such may prevent rather that increase understanding of 
how to resolve contemporary conflicts.  
Scholars like Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler have contributed to the notion of a 
change in the Character of War. In New Wars Old Wars, Kaldor, using the Balkan wars as her 
main case, argues that war between states is an anachronism, and that in particular economic 
interest is a driver for the continuation of conflict.
16 In The New Wars, Münkler argues that 
                                                 
12 Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632> 
accessed 25 Aug 2010. 
13 The implications of 4GW is thoroughly examined in Thomas X Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, (St.Paul, 
Zenith Press, 2004). 
14 For a critigue against Fourth generation Warfare see: Antulio J. Echevarria, II, Fourth Generation War and 
Other Myths (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005), iii. 
and Timothy J. Junio Military History and Fourth Generation Warfare, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 
32, No 2, April 2009, pp.243-269.  
15 Antulio J. Echevarria II (2005) <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf > [accessed 
3 Sep 2010]. 
16 Mary Kaldor, Old Wars New Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era., (Stanford, Standford University 
Press, 2001).   10 
states will no longer be the dominant actors, and that the emphasis has changed from the 
battle to a strategy of exhaustion.
17 Like Kaldor and Smith, Münkler almost totally reject the 
concept of symmetric interstate war in the contemporary international society, arguing that 
war as a means of pursuing state policy is an anachronism. Instead wars has become 
existential, a way of life, in which it is questionable whether fighting represents a means to an 
end, or actually is an end by itself.    
Whereas the above literature discuss the change of the phenomenon of war, with a 
possible exception of 4GW, terms like Hybrid War, Compound War and Three Block War 
addresses the development and the potential change of the tactical aspects of war. Colonel 
John J. McCuen discusses hybrid wars in a 2008 Military Review article.
18 According to 
McCuen, hybrid wars are :  
―a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct 
military operations against military targets while they must simultaneously – and more 
decisively – attempt to achieve control of the combat zone‘s indigenous populations 
by securing and stabilizing them‖.
19 
McCuen thus adresses one particularity of contemporary conflict by arguing that the 
soldier on the ground often will face multiple realities while operating in the combat zone. 
These realities may seem contradictory to the soldier because he will be fighting a dedicated 
enemy, while at the same time aiming at protecting the people that may be the basis for 
recruitment to the insurgency. Hybrid War indicates a mix of traditional symmetric warfare 
between regular forces and irregular, often non-state actors, using the whole spectrum of 
forceful means. The issues of irregularity and hybrid war have been discussed extensively by   
authors like Frank G. Hoffman and Nathan P. Freier.
20  
When addressing the National Press Club, Washington D.C. in October 1997, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles C Krulak used the term ―Three Block War‖ as 
useful for understanding the complexity of contemporary conflict.
21 According to Krulak, a 
soldier on the 21
st Century battlefield will simultaneously be: ―feeding and clothing displaced 
                                                 
17 Herfried Münkler, The New Wars, (Oxford, Polity Press, 2005). 
18 John J. Mccuen, Hybrid Wars, Military Review, March-April 2008, pp.107–113. 
19 Ibid, p.108.  
20 Frank G Hoffmann is a retired US Marine Corps officer that has written extensively on issues like irregular 
war and hybrid war. Mr Nathan P. Freier, is a Senior Fellow, at the International Security Program of the 
Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College. 
21 Charles C Krulak, The Three Block War, Address to the National Press Club, Whasington D.C., October 1997.   11 
refugees, …holding two warring tribes apart and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal 
mid-intensity battle‖. It is quite clear that by 2010, history has proved Krulak right, and that 
his description of the challenges of the modern battlefield fits neatly into the experiences of 
e.g. the Iraqi or Afghan theatres. 
Being one of the architects behind the US Field Manual 3-24 on counter insurgency, 
and author of The Accidental Guerrilla David Kilcullen has become one of the worlds leading 
experts on counter insurgency warfare. Kilcullen argues that in order to understand the 
driving factors and motivations for a people to involve in an armed uprising, one must 
appreciate the local nature of such conflicts.
22 Of particular interest is Kilcullen‘s theories on 
how terrorist organisations or insurgent movements uses deliberate intimidation techniques to 
alienate the population from the government and international forces, thus creating fertile 
grounds for recruitment to the insurgency.
23  The Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome consists of 
four phases, which Kilcullen calls: Infection, Contagion, Intervention and Rejection.
24 By 
deliberately using these techniques, Kilcullen argues that insurgent movements are able to use 
their local knowledge to gain an operational advantage, not easily equaled by e.g. coalition 
forces, as exemplified by the conflict in Afghanistan. Whereas Kilcullen‘s descriptions may 
not represent a new kind of war, insurgencies are not new phenomenon; his writings indeed 
provide useful insights in the particularities of contemporary warfare.  
Whereas the above mentioned authors argues that traditional interstate war is 
something of the past, thus the character of war has changed, Dr. Colin S Gray argues that this 
is questionable. Gray rejects the idea that the use of force may, as a rule, be understood 
outside its classical political framework. He claims that the issues of state interest and 
competing ideologies continue to be the basis for possible future conflicts, just as they have 
been throughout the history of mankind. In Another Bloody Century, Gray claims that 
interstate war can by no means be expected to be a concluded part of human history.
25 Gray 
argues that the rising Eastern powers of China and India and their investments in heavy 
military equipment like aircraft carriers, combined with the ever-present incompatibilities of 
state interest, provide ample basis for future conflicts. The contemporary so-called Low 
Intensity Conflicts (LIC) may very well be a sign of our time, but not necessarily an 
everlasting concept of conflict. A similar view is presented by Jack S. Levy in his review of 
                                                 
22 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
23 Ibid, pp.28-38. 
24 Ibid, p.35. 
25 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, (London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd, 2005).   12 
Münkler‘s The New Wars.
26 Levy claims that Münkler goes to far in excluding interstate war 
for the foreseeable future, thus arguing along the lines of Gray. Gray‘s argument is not of vital 
interest to this thesis. However, it displays that the overwhelming literature pointing at the 
new paradigm of international conflicts may miss important characteristics of conflict that 
might be universal. 
As the literature above displays, the scholarly focus on ―The New Wars‖ is substantial. 
Even though some authors criticize the idea that there exists such a phenomenon as ―New 
Wars‖, available literature and battlefield experience provides strong arguments in favour of a 
change in the character of war since the end of the Cold War. A consequence thereof is that 
the Napoleonic concept of industrialized interstate war based on mass mobilization of the 
nations‘ resources are of lesser relevance in understanding contemporary conflicts. Since the 
laws of war by and large were developed prior to the development described above, a possible 
consequence thereof may be that the laws of war may not cover contemporary conflict 
satisfactorily. 
War and Law  
A wide range of literature addresses law and the use of force. Of particular interest to this 
thesis is literature that discusses the use of force in contemporary conflicts in general, and the 
use of force against non-state actors in particular. Apart from scholarly literature on the 
subject, rulings by international judicial bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and International Court of Justice (ICJ), hereunder the findings of the International tribunals 
for respectively Yugoslavia and Rwanda provide relevant interpretations of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). Emphasis is also on the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) commentaries and guidance on the application of law in conflict. Even though the 
ICRC does not carry the authority to instruct states, it is mandated by the community of states 
to interpret the laws of war, and as such provides authoritative guidance on their application.   
Andreas Paulus and Mindia Vashakmadze argues in an article in the International 
Review of the Red Cross, that asymmetrical wars challenges the current state of international 
humanitarian law, in particular the distinction between international and non-international 
conflicts.
27 Paulus and Vahakmadze addresses the mechanisms that trigger the application of 
IHL in the new types of conflicts ―in particular, asymmetrical wars involving non-state 
                                                 
26 Jack S. Levy, Book review; The New Wars, Political Science Quarterly, Spring 2006, Vol. 121 Issue 1, 
pp.177-178. 
27 A. Paulus and M. Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical war and then notion of armed conflict – a tentative 
conceptualization, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 91, Number 873, March 2009, p.95.   13 
entities‖.
28 They argue that ―the traditional dichotomy between international and non-
international armed conflict does not quite match the complexity of modern day 
constellations‖.
29 By introducing the term ―Transnational Wars‖, they indicate that a third 
category of war exists, in which ―non-state groups operate transnationally or across the 
borders of occupied territories‖.
30 Transnational wars would fall outside the scope of common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and would in most cases not fit article 1 of additional 
protocol II. However, the authors argue that both the Hamdan decision of the US Supreme 
Court and the Tadic jurisdiction decision of the ICTY suggest the presence of an armed 
conflict not of an international nature also in cases not explicitly covered by existing treaty 
law.
31 Whereas control over territory is of substantial importance in article 1 to additional 
protocol II as to whether an armed group may be assumed to be party to a conflict, Paulus and 
Vahakmadze argues that the recent years development suggests that this requirement is of less 
importance in contemporary conflicts. However, they argue that the organisational, intensity 
and temporal requirement maintains its relevance as triggering mechanisms for the existence 
of an armed conflict, thus for the application of IHL. A consequence of the arguments put 
forward by Paulus and Vahakmadze would be that the 9/11 attack did not by it self amount to 
the existence of an armed conflict. Finally, they conclude by claiming that, even though IHL 
does not fit all aspects of contemporary armed conflict, it maintains its vital purpose of 
protecting the civilian population and those being hors de combat.
32  
In Untying the Gordian Knot, Geoffrey S. Corn and Eric Talbot Jensen discuss 
whether the laws of war ―apply to military operations against non-state actors‖.
33 Of particular 
interest is their discussion of which ―triggering‖ mechanisms that may allow for the 
application of the law of war as distinct to crime combating or human rights law. Whereas the 
triggering mechanisms for inter state war are relatively uncontroversial, this may not be the 
case for transnational wars against non-state entities. Corn and Jensen exemplifies this by the 
9/11 attack on the US and the consequent ―war on terror‖ arguing that ―the rapid evolution of 
the nature of warfare exemplified by the post 9/11 Global War on Terror has outpaced the 
evolution of the legal triggers for application of this regulatory framework‖.
34 They further 
argue that the clear distinction between international and non-international conflicts becomes 
                                                 
28 A. Paulus and M. Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical war and then notion of armed conflict – a tentative   
conceptualization, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 91, Number 873, March 2009, p.97. 
29 Ibid, p.100. 
30 Ibid, p.100. 
31 Ibid, p.99. 
32 Ibid, p100. 
33 G.S. Corn, E.T. Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A proposal for determining applicability of the laws of war 
to the war on terror, (Temple Law Review, Vol 81, 2008), p.787. 
34 Ibid, p.796.   14 
less clear in contemporary transnational conflicts, which typically takes place between a state 
and a non-state actor within the territory of a third state, using Israeli operations against 
Hezbollah in Lebanon as an example.
35 The challenges posed by such operations thus requires 
a revised approach as to what triggers the laws of war in order to avoid conflicts to remain 
unregulated. Corn and Jensen then connects the applicability of the laws of war to the use of 
status based Rules of Engagement (ROE). The basis for their argument is that by introducing 
status based ROEs as a basis for the application of force, states has accepted that an armed 
conflict exists that de facto implies the utilisation of the laws of war. Whereas conduct based 
ROEs basically allows for self defence measures when facing hostile acts or intents, status 
based ROEs allows for the use of force as an integral part of mission accomplishment.
36 
Because the introduction of status based ROEs ―implicitly invokes the target engagement 
authority to the laws of war‖, the authors argue that they represent the ―ultimate de facto 
indicator of armed conflict‖.
37 Hence, if a state invokes status based ROEs in the fight against 
non-state actors on a third state territory, as most certainly was the case against Al Qaeda, this 
would certainly amount to an armed conflict according to Corn and Jensen. 
A potential weakness with this argument is of course that a state may introduce status 
based ROEs also in situations which otherwise would not fall under the scope of the law of 
armed conflict, allowing for forceful military measures in situations normally assumed to 
amount to crime. Usually, military ROEs are more permissive than what would be accepted 
for crime combating, thus states may invoke status based ROEs based on national interest and 
not a thorough consideration of the qualification of the conflict. 
In International Law and the Use of Force, Christine Gray discusses both Jus ad 
bellum and Jus in bello issues.
38 Gray examines the use of force in a wide range of conflict-
scenarios, e.g. civil wars and the use of force, the notion of self-defence, the use of force 
against terrorism and the UN and the use of force. Of particular interest to this thesis is her 
discussion on the use of military force in cases of terrorism and non-state actors. Gray argues 
that existing law may be applied in most contemporary cases regarding the use of force, but 
indicates that situations like the one in Afghanistan and the rise of international terrorism may 
put into question the relevance of international law as it stands. She continues by arguing that 
state interest, hence realpolitik, makes international law dynamic in a way that is unusual in 
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domestic law.
39 There are, according to Gray, few disagreements about the actual law, neither 
treaty nor customary, but usually about the facts and their interpretation.  
Gray arguably provides a viable normative framework for examining the use of armed 
force in various situations. She presents a nuanced view on the application of law balanced 
against, for example, the impact of state interest, thus she is sensitive to the political aspect of 
international law. As the case stands, Gray‘s position is arguably that, even though some 
lacunas exist, existing law sufficiently covers contemporary conflicts also related to terrorism 
and non-state actors.  
In Targeted Killing in International Law, Dr. Nils Melzer discusses the various aspects 
of states targeting individuals as a function of law enforcement or within the paradigm of 
hostilities.
40 Apart from Dr. Melzer‘s own research on the area, the book entails the 
conclusions and indeed the discussions presented during the ICRC expert meetings on the 
subject on Direct Participation in Hostilities from 2003 – 2008.  Melzer‘s book is arguably the 
most comprehensive discussion on targeted killing - thus states‘ use of lethal force against 
individuals - currently available.  
Whereas targeting as a function of law enforcement is of marginal interest to this 
thesis, his discussion of the paradigm of hostilities is at its core. Melzer provides a thorough 
discussion on hostilities, thus addressing the core issues of applying force against non-state 
actors. Such actors may, as will be shown, only be targeted during the time in which they 
actively participate in hostilities.  
Melzer addresses the relevant provisions of international law relating to both international and 
non-international conflicts. He accepts as a fact that international law addressing non-
international armed conflicts is less developed than law addressing international armed 
conflicts. However, he claims that existing law, also with respect to states‘ use of targeted 
killing, provides satisfactory legal basis for states‘ use of force. 
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law provides authoritative guidance on the use of armed 
force against civilians.
41 It subsumes the discussions and conclusions of the ICRC expert 
meetings as mentioned above.  It does not ―endeavour to be binding to states‖, but ―reflect the 
ICRC‘s institutional position as to how existing IHL should be interpreted‖. 
42 
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The ICRC guidance presents a restrictive view on what amounts to Direct Participation, hence 
is emplaced firmly within the ICRC tradition of emphasising the protection of civilians in 
conflict. In particular, the Interpretive Guidance argues that the requirement for direct 
participation for civilians must be understood literally. As such, the so-called revolving door 
problem ―does not represent a malfunction‖, but is an integral part of IHL.
43 It is a challenge 
though that the restrictive approach provided by the ICRC is currently not widely accepted by 
states. The Rules of Engagement used by e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan is substantially more 
permissive than the ICRC guidance.
44 
In Wippman and Evangelista‘s New Wars, New Laws it is questioned whether the 
existing legal framework sufficiently covers the particularities of the new wars. The book 
consists of a collection of essays addressing the application of law in contemporary conflicts. 
It provides arguments suggesting that existing law is insufficient, thus in some circumstances 
being partly irrelevant, to arguments resembling those of Gray and Melzer. For the purpose of 
this thesis, New Wars, New laws provide an interesting contrast to those favouring use of the 
law as it stands. 
In addition to the above-mentioned literature, the UN Charter, the Geneva 
Conventions and the rulings of internationally approved institutions, such as the International 
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, provide the legal background for this 
thesis.  
 
The problem to be addressed 
As the literature above suggest, the ‖New Wars‖ pose various challenges to states related to 
the use of military force against non-state actors. This thesis aims at examining the legal basis 
for the application of force in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and how the issue of law 
actually figured in the Norwegian discussion and decision-making process with respect to its 
support and participation in that operation. A founding assumption thus being that the legal 
complexities of contemporary conflicts, e.g. the counter insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, 
requires substantial in depth legal analysis prior to and during the conflict, in particular related 
to the Rules of Engagement and targeting procedures. It will be divided in two main sections. 
The first section aims at providing a conceptual legal framework for examining states‘ use of 
armed force against non-state actors. Such application of force may not be sufficiently 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p.1035. 
44 Based on the authors experience from the Afghan theatre. The ROEs are classified and can not be referred to 
in any detail in this thesis.   17 
clarified within existing international law and may be subject to challenges regarding a 
potentially weak normative framework.  
Section one of this thesis consequently aims at: 
  Examining the major issues of legality related to the application of military force 
against non-state actors, hence providing a normative framework that may serve as a 
basis for further analysis. 
 
Section two will examine the Norwegian case. In particular it will aim at identifying the 
degree to which issues of law actually figured in the Norwegian decision-making process, 
their impact and relevance. The selected time-span for this thesis is the period from the 2001 
9/11 attacks and until the end of 2002. By the end of 2002, Norway was firmly established as 
an active contributor to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and most decisions 
regarding Norwegian force contributions had been made.  
Section two consequently aims at:  
  Examining the impact and relevance of law in the Norwegian discussion and decision-
making process prior to and during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.  
 
Methodology and structure  
Analysing the Norwegian discussion and decision making process in view of a legal 
framework applicable to modern conflict is an ambitious undertaking. It is of that reason 
necessary to focus on those areas of law particularly relevant to the use of force against non-
state actors, and to limit the case study accordingly. The methodology and structure depicted 
below should allow for combining a sufficient in depth discussion of law with a relevant case 
study of the Norwegian case.  
Methodologically, this thesis will discuss the major aspects of international 
humanitarian law pertaining to the Afghan conflict and secondly examine how the issues of 
law figured in the Norwegian discussion and decision making process.  The examination of 
the Norwegian case will predominantly apply a qualitative approach using statements from 
representatives of the Government and Parliament, material from official archives and 
interviews with representatives of the decision making bodies, e.g. Department of Defence, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Staff in order to present a representative view on 
the Norwegian position. Based on the normative framework provided in section one, it will 
then analyse the extent to which the Norwegian process reflected the parts of international   18 
humanitarian law relevant to the Norwegian participation in OEF and finally conclude to the 
extent which these issues had bearing on the Norwegian process.  
Section One will examine the major legal issues relating to the use of armed force 
against non-state actors in general and within the scope of the Afghan conflict in particular. 
Of particular interest is the legal qualification of the conflict, the status of the actors and the 
issue of targeting. It aims at presenting the main legal issues pertaining to the Afghan conflict 
based on the existing provisions of International Law. 
Section Two examines how Norway dealt with the issue of law in accordance with the 
decision to participate in OEF. Norway decided shortly after the 9/11 incidents to support US 
operations in what became a global effort against international terrorism. Most notably, 
Norway decided to offer military assistance to the US-led OEF in the autumn of 2001. In this 
section I will present the relevant parts of the discussion and decision-making process as it 
appeared in the Norwegian Government, Parliament, the military and the media from the 9/11 
incident until the end of 2002. I have limited the time span to the end of 2002, because by 
then, most major and principally important decisions regarding Norwegian support to OEF 
was made. 
Since the Norwegian participation in OEF in many ways was a novel experience, a 
brief look at the Norwegian history of using military force after the Second World War and 
the Norwegian political situation of the period in question will be presented. 
I will then examine the Norwegian discussion and decision-making process. The 
decision-making process was mainly a governmental issue, even though on some occasions 
Parliament was consulted and did, of course, discuss Norway‘s involvement. Consequently, I 
will focus on the sources connected to the Government, be it within the political leadership, at 
the bureaucratic level or within the military leadership. However, Parliamentary sources 
provide useful information as well, as do the discussion that took place in the media. Of 
particular interest will be to identify arguments either related to international or domestic law. 
Whereas Norway deployed a range of military resources to Afghanistan, this thesis will 
mainly use the process related to the F-16 contribution. The F-16s was the military capacity 
that, apart from the Special Forces, was most likely to use their weapons. 
 
Limitations and factors of uncertainty  
There are applications of military power that are neither war nor conflict. The military can be 
used in humanitarian catastrophes, natural disasters and in other types of non-armed   19 
operations. Such operations can easily be termed military operations, but they do not include 
the use of force. Such operations are not within the scope of this thesis. 
In contemporary conflicts one will find commercial actors that act on behalf of a state 
such as security companies or similar bodies, like the US security firm Blackwater. The 
involvement of such firms in conflicts or war may present legal challenges, however the 
activities of such actors are outside the scope of this thesis. 
Political decisions related to questions of national security and the use of military 
force are often conducted behind closed doors and without official minutes. The decisions are 
available as official statements, but the discussions and processes that led to those decisions 
will rarely be made public. Further, OEF and ISAF are ongoing operations. Even though 
official archives contain some unclassified material, classification is a challenge. I have 
identified several documents that provide information of interest to this thesis that cannot be 
used because of classification. Both the issue of closed doors discussions and classification 
may reduce the accuracy of the thesis. 
However, having also had access to classified sources, I have found no material that 
contradicts my assessments or conclusions. The use of various open sources, interviews and 
available archive material has proved sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.  
  
Afghanistan and the conflict; a background  
Even though a thorough description of the Afghan conflict falls outside the scope of this 
thesis, some background is required in order to comprehend the issues discussed herein. 
Contradictory to a common perception, Afghanistan has not always been war torn. The 
country experienced a period of relative peace and stability from the mid 1930s until the coup 
d‘état in 1973.
45 Arguably, the main issues of the contemporary Afghan conflict can be traced 
back to the 1979 Soviet invasion and the establishment of the Afghan resistance. Prior to the 
Soviet invasion, the forces represented by ethnical, tribal, political and religious diversity 
were reasonably balanced, thus Afghanistan did not experience the factionalism seen after the 
Soviet occupation and up to the present day. However, when Mohammed Daoud, the King‘s 
cousin, instigated a bloodless coup d‘état in 1973, it started the development that ended with 
the Soviet invasion in 1979.
46  
The Soviet occupation and its consequences are assumed to be known to the reader. It 
officially ended in 1989 with a war-torn Afghanistan ravaged by war and more fragmented 
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than ever; the infrastructure severely damaged by years of harsh fighting and packed with 
weapons provided mainly by the Soviets, the US and Saudi Arabia.
47 
The Afghan resistance, popularly called the ―Mujahedin‖, only partly united during 
the occupation, fell into disarray and factional activity. Since it had not united to any degree 
during the occupation, it presented no unifying force when the occupation ended. In addition, 
the resistance could be divided into two main categories. One had its origin within 
Afghanistan and got its support mainly from the US through the Pakistani intelligence service 
(ISI). It is commonly accepted that this category consisted of seven identifiable groups.
48 The 
other consisted mainly of non-Afghans, the main supporter of whom was Saudi Arabia, and 
was often termed Afghan-Arabs.
49 Arab and Muslim-dominated countries were the main 
providers of operatives to this group, Osama bin-Laden being one of them. Internal strife was 
common both within the seven Afghan groups and between the Afghans and the Afghan-
Arabs. The origins of Al Qaeda can be found in the latter.
50 
The early 1990s were marked by continuous fighting and civil war. The various seven 
Afghan Mujahedin groups fought each other as well as the Soviet-installed regime of 
Najibullah with its main stronghold in and around the capital of Kabul. The early 90s period 
was one of considerable instability and central power was weak or even non-existent. Several 
authors claim that the combination of a war-torn society literally armed to its teeth, a weak 
central power and commanders with private armies pursuing own interests were driving 
factors in the substantial destabilisation of Afghanistan.
51 It also paved the way for the 
political movement that was the aim of the US attack 7
th October 2001, the Taliban.  
The Taliban, which basically means ―religious student‖, originated in the southern 
parts of Afghanistan with its main stronghold in and around the city of Kandahar. The 
organisation, lead by Mullah Mohammad Omar, practised a fundamentalist version of Sunni 
Islam, influenced by the Deobandis, prescribing almost total adherence to the original text of 
the Koran and the Hadiths.
52 This version of Islam was taught at various Islamic religious 
schools, ―Madrassas‖, in refugee camps in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. It played a significant 
role in preparing young Afghans to submit to the ideology of the Taliban hardcore. Important 
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is also the fact that the Taliban basically was a Pashto movement with a substantial Pashto 
nationalist agenda.  
By the time of the US invasion in 2001, the Taliban controlled most parts of 
Afghanistan, except some parts in the North East. The Taliban regime represented as such the 
de-facto rulers of Afghanistan, though only being acknowledged by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates.
53 Apparently, the Taliban was at first welcomed by large parts 
of the Afghan society because they ended the bloody civil war and brought some kind of 
stability to the country.
54 However, it soon became apparent that their interpretation of Islam 
meant a harsh implementation of the Sharia, and no opposition was tolerated. Human rights 
were generally abandoned and especially women could no longer claim individual rights.  
In Taliban-led Afghanistan, the internationalist movement of Al Qaeda found 
sanctuary. Whereas the Taliban was marked by a religious nationalist agenda, Al Qaeda was 
truly internationalist. Statements from the Al Qaeda leadership, in particular Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman Al Zawahiri frequently referred to the reestablishment of the Caliphate as their 
final goal. Jason Burke argues that Al Qaeda cannot be understood as a traditional 
organisation but more like an idea or even a tactic.
55 According to Burke, Al Qaeda as an 
organisation with a leadership, members and some kind of bureaucracy to some extent existed 
between 1996 and 2001. Its core consisted mostly of the so-called Afghan-Arabs, people who 
had participated in the resistance against the Soviets, but normally not of Afghan origin. The 
Afghan-Arabs may somewhat imprecisely be described as alienated individuals looking for a 
cause, a cause that could be found in the training camps in Afghanistan organised by, amongst 
others, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden, himself a Saudi, had experience from the resistance 
against the Soviets, he had financial resources and he obviously had a cause. Bin Laden and 
the Al Qaeda organisation found shelter inside Afghanistan and allegedly planned what 
became the 9/11 operation from these training camps. 
The exact relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban is somewhat unclear. None 
of them have been highly talkative. What seems clear is that not all of Al Qaeda‘s activities 
were well received by the Taliban regime.
56 There are indications of disagreements and 
criticism. Even though Al Qaeda found shelter in Afghanistan and collaborated with the 
Taliban, there are few if any indications that Al Qaeda operated effectively as agents for the 
regime. Burke argues that although the Taliban and Al Qaeda were closely connected, they 
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must be perceived as individual and separate entities - in other words, legally distinct. The 
internationalist goals of Al Qaeda did not fit nicely into the local and Pashto nationalist aims 
of the Taliban, although their religious ideas had certain similarities. A slightly different view 
is presented by Crews/Tarzi indicating that by the end of 2000, Al Qaeda units ―contributed 
around 30 percent to 40 percent of the Taliban‘s core military forces‖.
57 
What remains undisputed is that Osama bin-Laden and his proponents could operate quite 
freely inside Afghanistan and had the de facto protection of the Taliban regime.  
 
Operation Enduring Freedom and transitional rule 
The 9/11 actions of Al Qaeda lead to a US response; the launch of Operation Enduring 
Freedom on October 7
th 2001. OEF was initially a US-led operation coordinated with Afghan 
groups that resisted the Taliban.
58 These Afghan groups were mainly situated in the Northern 
part of the country and were frequently referred to as the Northern Alliance. Soon the UK, 
and eventually a wide range of states pledged support to the US and contributed with military 
assistance. Operation Enduring Freedom became an ―alliance of the willing‖, with 
considerable international support.  
OEF swept Afghanistan quickly. Kabul fell by mid November 2001, and the original 
stronghold of the Taliban, the city of Kandahar, was surrendered by early December. After the 
seizure of the major cities, the operation continued in the eastern mountains of Tora Bora in 
December 2001 and followed by Operation Anaconda in the spring of 2002. At this time, the 
Bonn agreement of December 2001 had already made provisions for an Interim Authority that 
should prepare for an emergency Loya Jirga to form within six months.
59 The Emergency 
Loya Jirga convened at 10th June 2002, and 13
th June saw Hamid Karzai elected as head of 
the transitional government.
60 The establishment of the Emergency Loya Jirga and the 
election of Hamid Karzai is usually looked upon as the moment in time where the Afghan 
conflict ceased to be an international armed conflict (the parties being the Taliban on one side 
and the US and OEF allies on the other) and became a non-international conflict.  
Even though internationally recognised Afghan authorities were installed in June 2002, OEF 
continued, and is still ongoing. The operation continues to be a major part of the alleged US 
―War on Terror‖, and the US boasts a substantial military presence within Afghanistan. From 
2006, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has gradually taken over 
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the military responsibility previously conducted within the framework of OEF. By August 
2009, ISAF was the major foreign military force in Afghanistan consisting of more than 40 
contributing nations with approximately 50,000 troops.
61 The numbers will increase 
throughout 2009 – 2010 because of the US force expansion programme. Operation Enduring 
Freedom consists of approximately 20,000 troops, mainly US, though the exact number is not 
known. A major emphasis both within the frameworks of OEF and ISAF is put on training 
and equipping the Afghan National army (ANA) in order to enable it to independently handle 
the Afghan security situation. 
Even though the Taliban regime was toppled in 2001 – 2002, large parts of 
Afghanistan continue to be war torn. Especially some provinces in the South and East, that 
used to be Taliban strongholds, frequently experience hostilities. After a relatively calm 
period from 2002 to 2004, the intensity of the fighting has escalated. There can be little doubt 
that Taliban and affiliated organisations violently reject the elected government and the 
foreign presence in Afghanistan.
 62 
 
Norway’s participation in OEF; facts and figures 
As one of many nations, Norway immediately pledged support to the US after the 9/11 
incident. Shortly after the incident, work began within the Norwegian Foreign Office and the 
Department of Defence to decide if and how Norway could support the US in its efforts 
against global terrorism. The Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Sigurd Frisvold, 
participated at the time of the 9/11 incident in a NATO Military Committee meeting in 
Hungary together with most of his NATO colleagues. Frisvold recalls that he and his 
colleagues, after a short meeting, understood that NATO would be involved in the aftermath 
of the incident, and most likely in line with the provisions made in Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
63 
Frisvold returned to Norway during the 12
th September 2001, and already on the 13
th 
the Chiefs of Staff were summoned for a meeting aimed at discussing possible Norwegian 
military force contributions. In case of a political decision in favour of such contributions, the 
list of military capabilities that could contribute to the support of the US militarily exceeded 
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ten, according to Frisvold. The list included Special Forces Units, F-16 fighter aircraft and 
mine-clearing units. 
NATO invoked article V already on the 12
th September in support of the US. Article V, 
commonly known as the ‗one for all, all for one‘ article, states:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual 
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
64 
 
Invoking article V made it clear that the 9/11 attack would have consequences for NATO and 
its member nations.  
The decision to actively support the US in Operation Enduring Freedom and contribute with 
military forces was taken by the Norwegian Government and publicised 30
th November 
2001.
65 The initial Norwegian offer amounted to the following: 
  Special Forces Units 
  Mine-clearing units 
  A National Support element in Kandahar 
  One C-130 transport aircraft to be stationed in Kirgizstan in cooperation with Danish 
and Dutch units 
  15 lightly armoured vehicles as requested by the US 
  4 F-16 fighter aircraft, also requested by the US, to be deployed as soon as the 
logistical situation enabled deployment 
The Norwegian Special Forces entered Operation Enduring Freedom at an early stage. Exact 
data about their participation is not known due to classification. 
The Norwegian mine-clearing units were primarily used in and around Kabul.  
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The Norwegian C-130 operated from the US-led Manas Air Force base in Kirgizstan. The 
Norwegian participation was a coordinated venture in cooperation with Danish and Dutch 
units. This venture was named the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF). The Norwegian 
C-130 regularly operated inside Afghanistan, conducting transport missions in locations 
including Kabul, Baghram and Mazar e-Sharif.  
The Norwegian F-16s also operated inside the EPAF framework. It consisted of 6 F-16 fighter 
aircraft operating from the Manas Airbase in Kirgizstan from 1
st October 2002 to 1
st April 
2003. The Norwegian F-16s flew daily missions over Afghanistan, providing close air support 
for alliance ground troops. On two occasions the Norwegian aircraft launched weapons 
against opposing forces.
66 The exact number of casualties is not known, but allegedly several 
Taliban fighters were killed. 
The Norwegian support to Operation Enduring Freedom continued with various force 
contributions until 2006, when Norwegian participation in the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) became the preferred political option. As of the summer of 
2006, Norway withdrew all forces from OEF, focusing entirely on ISAF. 
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Section One; Conceptual framework 
 
Chapter One, The question of legality 
 
Introduction 
As the literature described above demonstrates, the particularities of contemporary warfare 
present legal challenges to the use of force that is not substantially covered through existing 
treaty or customary law. This section aims at discussing legal issues related to the use of 
armed force against non-state actors. The application of force outside the law-enforcement 
paradigm is basically regulated through what is commonly known as the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL), commonly referred to as jus in 
bello.
67 According to Fleck, IHL: ―comprises all those rules of international law which are 
designed to regulate the treatment of the individual – civilian or military, wounded or active – 
in international armed conflicts‖.
68 
This thesis will mainly discuss in bello issues, but some aspects of whether the use of armed 
force is justifiable, jus ad bellum, will also be addressed.  
Its main scope is to ―set limits to the way in which force may be used by prohibiting 
certain weapons and methods of warfare, by insisting that attacks be directed only at military 
objectives and that they should not cause disproportionate civilian casualties‖.
69 IHL thus 
introduces rules that aim at reducing the suffering caused by war. A particularly important 
element of IHL is the distinction between those who may legally fight, combatants, and those 
who are protected, i.e. civilians and other protected individuals. IHL does not allow for a 
combination; only combatants may legally take part in hostilities. 
IHL as described above mainly addresses international armed conflicts, i.e. interstate 
war; it does not apply similarly to conflicts which are not of an international nature. However, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, contemporary conflicts are usually not of an international 
character. Whereas parts of IHL applicable to international armed conflicts are relevant for 
non-international armed conflicts as well, IHL also contains some provisions that specifically 
address non-international armed conflicts. According to the ICRC study on international 
humanitarian law, ―humanitarian treaty law does not regulate in sufficient detail a large 
proportion of today‘s armed conflicts, that is non-international armed conflicts, because these 
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conflicts are subject to far fewer treaty rules than are international conflicts‖.
70 Arguably, 
conflicts like the Afghan conflict are not covered by a comprehensive legal regime in the way 
that international armed conflicts are. A further complicating issue is that contemporary 
conflicts are transnational in a sense that they do not fall easily within the scope of neither 
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions or additional protocol 2 to the Convention.
71 
I intend in the following to identify the general provisions of international law related 
to armed conflict, in particular to address those areas relevant to the use of armed force 
against non-state actors.  
From the perspective of international law, the initial distinction that must be made is to 
identify the presence of an armed conflict and qualify it in the legal sense. I further intend to 
examine the question of acts of aggression that may justify an armed response based on the 
self-defence paradigm, in particular whether self-defence is a viable option against non-state 
actors. For NATO countries, military application of force is regulated through Rules of 
Engagement and targeting procedures. Since international law arguably does not allow for 
non-state actors to be targeted by a membership approach, I will in particular examine the 
issues of defining hostilities and the time during which non-combatants are assumed to 
participate in hostilities. 
  
The legal regime; general provisions 
International law regulating armed conflict is, like all international law, a mixture of treaty 
and customary law. There is a particular dynamic connected to international law, based on the 
fact that it is developed through state practice and under the influence of state interest. Since 
no international body exists that may effectively enforce international law, its feasibility is 
highly dependent on state acceptance. However, an internationally accepted legal regime 
exists that is considered to apply to most situations of armed conflict. Arguably, most states 
tend to apply to those regulations, even when it is questionable whether the situation actually 
satisfies the prerequisites for being an armed conflict, or its qualification is unclear, as may be 
the situation in Afghanistan.  
IHL contains a wide range of treaties that regulates the use of force in armed conflicts. 
Some of these treaties, like the Geneva Conventions (GC) I – IV, are considered to represent 
customary international law, and thus binding to all states irrespective of those states being a 
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party to the convention. The GC additional protocols I and II of 1977, have not achieved the 
near-universal acceptance of the 1949 protocols, but they contain some provisions that are 
considered customary law, such as GC additional protocol II, article 4 on fundamental 
guarantees.
72  
The provisions of international law relevant to this thesis would mainly be the 
common article 3 of GC I – IV and the provisions of GC additional protocol II of 1977 
assumed to be customary law.  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
represent international institutions that enforce international law. The ICJ is part of the UN 
system and only states may be parties before the court. The ICJ:  
…acts as a world court. The Court has a dual jurisdiction : it decides, in accordance 
with international law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it by States 
(jurisdiction in contentious cases); and it gives advisory opinions on legal questions at 
the request of the organs of the United Nations or specialized agencies authorised to 
make such a request (advisory jurisdiction).
73  
Whereas only states can be parties to cases before the ICJ, the ICC prosecutes individuals that 
are connected to ―genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes‖ in situations where 
these individuals are not prosecuted domestically.
74 The ICC is an independent institution 
based on the Rome Statute of 17
th July 1998.  
Rulings by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are 
useful sources of law, as are the International Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Most states will accept such rulings as customary law, and act accordingly in situations of 
armed conflict. However, it is a challenge that some states, like for example the US, whereas 
being a party to the ICJ, does not invariably accept its jurisdiction ICJ and it is not a party to 
the Rome Statute of the ICC.
75  
Finally, IHL contains a wide range of treaties regulating particular types of weapons or 
methods of warfare, like for example the Anti-personnel Mine Convention of 1997. This 
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thesis assumes that such treaties are valid to the contracting parties regardless of whether the 
conflict is of an international or non-international nature.
76  
Christine Gray argues that the starting point for any examination of the law is ―the 
prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter‖.
77 The UN Charter is ratified 
by nearly all states and must be perceived to represent customary law; binding to all states. 
However, there are two important exceptions; self-defence and use of force approved by the 
UN Security Council. My starting point will be to examine the exceptions from the 
prohibition of the use of force and from there derive further issues that are relevant to the use 
of armed force against non-state actors. 
 
The right to use force, Jus ad Bellum 
The UN Charter explicitly forbids armed aggression as a means of pursuing national 
interests.
78 The prohibition on the use of force is generally acknowledged to represent jus 
cogens, although there are some disagreements about how to interpret this prohibition as, 
amongst others, the 1999 Kosovo conflict vividly demonstrated.
79 The only exceptions are the 
right to self-defence as defined in the charter‘s Article 51 and the provisions made under it‘s 
Chapter VII regulating the Security Council‘s right to act in order to prevent “threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression‖.
80  
There is a discussion in the international community on the legality of humanitarian 
intervention as a possible third option of lawful application of force without the explicit 
consent of the UNSC.
81 There seems to be a division in the scholarly community between 
those in the legal profession who - according to the principles of de lege lata - cannot find 
provisions for such an interpretation, and scholars of political science and international 
politics who seem to focus more on policy considerations, hence the dynamic development of 
international law, based on state practice.
82 The issue of humanitarian intervention and 
legality, interesting though it is, will not be touched upon in this thesis, mainly because it is 
only marginally relevant to the topics discussed.
83 
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As stated above, the UN Charter recognises two lawful ways of applying force, either 
by invoking self-defence or by the authority of an explicit UNSC resolution. Self-defence in 
particular was put forward as the motivation for the US attack on Afghanistan in October 
2001. This thesis asserts that self-defence may, under certain circumstances, be invoked 
against non-state actors. I will in the following examine the two exceptions to the prohibition 
on the use of force, with particular emphasis on self-defence in the Afghan and OEF context. 
 
Use of force based on UNSC resolutions 
The codification of the UNSC authority is found in the Charter‘s Chapter VII, addressing 
―Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of 
Aggression‖.
84 If the UNSC finds that the relevant conditions exist, the UN Charter provides a 
set of measures available to restore ―international peace and security‖. The SC has been 
extremely cautious about authorising the use of force against alleged aggressor states.
85 
However, it has authorised a number of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, 
mainly with the consent of the receiving nations.
86 A number of these operations involve the 
presence of various types of non-state actors, reaching from mere criminal organisations to 
organisations with a political agenda. The possibility to apply force in such operations is 
normally laid down in the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) applicable to each particular 
operation. For peacekeeping operations, use of force would normally be in situations of self-
defence only, whereas peace enforcement operations would normally boast more robust 
mandates, allowing limited use of force outside the self-defence paradigm.
87 As such, the use 
of force against non-state actors based on UNSC resolutions is undisputed, as has been 
demonstrated through several such operations in Africa and on the Balkans.
88  
 
Self-defence and the Afghan case 
The other exception from the prohibition of the use of force is ―the inherent right to self-
defence‖. The right to self-defence against an armed attack is undisputed in international law. 
The UN Charter codified in article 51 what was previously accepted as customary law:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
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right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.
89 
For a state to exercise the right to self-defence, Article 51 of the UN Charter uses the term 
armed attack. However, the Charter is not precise in defining what constitutes an armed 
attack. Is a simple border episode involving exchange of gunfire sufficient, or are more 
extensive actions required? The UN general assembly resolution 3314, Definition of 
aggression, is aimed at defining more precisely what constitutes an armed attack.
90 In the 
frequently cited Nicaragua ruling, the ICJ used the Definition of Aggression to support its 
view.
91 The Nicaragua judgement is later upheld as constitutive in defining acts of aggression, 
hence the definition of aggression is assessed to be the single most important codification of 
what constitutes an armed attack. Consequently, in order to invoke self-defence, states have to 
demonstrate that an act of aggression has been conducted. 
However, a military response invoked by claiming self-defence cannot be punitive or 
be characterised as a reprisal in order to be lawful. The inherent right to self-defence is only 
lawful when it is used to repel either an ongoing attack or an attack that is obviously being 
prepared. The conditions that would have allowed for the use of force in self-defence prior to 
the 9/11 attacks must then still be assumed to have been present when the US and its allies 
launched their attacks on Afghanistan some weeks later. Clearly, this is a difficult question.  
Even if an act of aggression has been conducted, further clarification is required with 
respect to a wide or narrow interpretation of the right to self-defence.
 92 A widely interpreted 
right to self-defence would include pre-emptive or even anticipatory self-defence, whereas a 
narrow interpretation would allow for self-defence to be invoked only when an attack actually 
is launched or obviously being prepared. The former interpretation would allow states 
substantial flexibility in deciding when self-defence may be invoked. However, the concept of 
pre-emptive self-defence is a case of continuous controversy, and the US attempt to ―extend 
the right to self-defence to cover pre-emptive action has proved extremely controversial‖.
93 
According to Gray: ―In practice, states making their claims to self-defence try to put forward 
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arguments that will avoid doctrinal controversy and appeal to the widest possible range of 
states.‖
94 In the case of Afghanistan and the US attack, self-defence was launched, not to 
prevent an ongoing attack, but to prevent future aggression like the 9/11 incident. 
   One obvious weakness with the UN Charter, in connection with contemporary 
conflicts, is that it only discusses the actions of states.
95 Irregular forces or non-state actors are 
not mentioned. There are no explicit references to such actors in the UN Charter, and it is 
commonly recognised that the UN Charter discusses state behaviour. As an example, Israeli 
actions against Hamas and other non-state groups are usually justified by reference to self-
defence. In its advisory opinion on the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory, the ICJ advised against the lawfulness of the wall, partly because it was built to 
protect Israel against a non-state actor within an Israeli-controlled area.
96 In the case of Congo 
vs. Cameroon, the ICJ also found that and armed attack triggering self-defence has to be 
launched from another state.
97 State practice before 9/11 shows few examples of self-defence 
being used to justify a military response to an attack from a non-state actor. Most of these 
examples are found in US and Israeli practice, and they did usually not receive support by the 
UNSC or by the majority of states.
98 Consequently, from the viewpoint of international law, it 
seems that invoking self-defence against a non-state actor may be controversial.
99 
Osama bin-Laden published a Fatwa effectively declaring war on the US in 1996 and 
repeated it in 1998. He was assumed to have engineered the attacks on the US embassies in 
Kenya and in Tanzania in 1998 and on the USS Cole in 2000.
100 There is no evidence 
suggesting that the US considered itself at war with Al Qaeda at the time. Even though the 
US, on President Clinton‘s orders, retaliated against alleged Al Qaeda strongholds in 
Afghanistan, the above-mentioned episodes were predominantly considered criminal acts, not 
acts of war. The criminal justice model, not a military reply, was the primary instrument of 
pursuing these incidents.
101 Incidents where military force has been used against terrorism, 
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have by-and-large been justified by the lack of law enforcement resources and not because 
they were assumed to constitute acts of war. The British use of the Army in Northern Ireland 
is an example of this. However, 12
th September 2001, the UNSC passes resolution 1368 as its 
initial response to the 9/11 attacks. The resolution was ―Recognizing the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter‖.
102 This was the first time 
the UNSC made an explicit reference to the right to self-defence in response to attack from a 
non-state actor. The immediate response from most states favoured the US position that the Al 
Qaeda attacks represented an act of aggression in what Gray calls ―an impressive unity among 
governments‖, thus justifying a forceful response based on the right to self-defence.
 103 The 
US position was that the 9/11 attacks represented a new kind of war, and that the US ―is 
clearly at war with Al Qaeda‖.
104  
UNSC resolution 1368 and subsequent UNSC resolutions, the US and NATO actions 
in Afghanistan, and the fact that these actions were widely supported by the international 
community and several legal studies, provide a strong argument in favour of the US view that 
the right to self-defence, under given circumstances, also applies to attacks from non-state 
actors.
 Gray claims that ―States today do not challenge the view that actions by irregulars can 
constitute armed attack… .‖
105 Invoking self-defence against Afghanistan then became the 
initial effort in the US-led global war on terror.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however, contests the view 
that there can be such a thing as a global war on terror in the legal sense. As stated by the 
ICRC: 
It is doubtful, absent further factual evidences, whether the totality of the violence 
taking place between states and transnational networks can be deemed to be an armed 
conflict in the legal sense. Armed conflict requires a certain intensity of violence, and 
among other things, opposing parties.
106  
The question then is: against whom to respond? Even though Al Qaeda had 
strongholds or even bases inside Afghanistan, would that justify self-defence actions against 
the sovereign state of Afghanistan? It was soon accepted that the 9/11 incidents were planned 
and executed by Al Qaeda, not the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. For an attack on 
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Afghanistan to be lawful, arguably, Al Qaeda must effectively have been agents for the 
Taliban or sufficiently strong links had to exist between the two. It is doubtful whether just 
harbouring Al Qaeda would have made an acceptable legal justification.
107 As discussed in 
the introduction, Burke claims that Al Qaeda did most probably not operate as agents of the 
Taliban. On the other hand, Neamatollah Nojumi claims that Al Qaeda military units fought 
alongside Taliban forces against Masood by the end of 2000, thus indicating a formalised 
relationship between the two.
108 What remains a fact is that the Taliban let Al Qaeda use 
Afghan soil for training the operatives who eventually carried out the 9/11 incidents.  
Even so, this thesis asserts that Al Qaeda and the Taliban must be perceived as legally 
distinct entities. It is conceivable that the US attacked Al Qaeda bases and strongholds inside 
Afghanistan without aiming to topple the Taliban regime, but this would be a highly difficult 
option of obvious practical reasons.  
When the US launched OEF, it attacked both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Even though 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda were accepted as distinct entities, there are no indications that they 
were perceived as such from a ROE or targeting perspective. A distinction was made between 
that status of Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees with respect to international law, stating that 
whereas there were arguments in favour of accepting Taliban operatives as Prisoners of War, 
this would not be the case for Al Qaeda Operatives.
109. Consequently, the US attacked a 
subject of international law, Afghanistan, based on the right to self-defence, arguing that 
sufficiently strong links existed between the Taliban and Al Qaeda to justify the attack. It may 
further be argued that the practical difficulties of separating the two in a military operation 
inside Afghanistan and the violent nature of the Taliban regime contributed to the 
legitimisation of the US attack.  
As the case stands, state practice in the aftermath of 9/11 and UNSC resolutions, 
combined with statements from authoritative practitioners of international law, point in the 
direction that self-defence against a non-state actor under certain circumstances may be 
justified under the existing provisions of international law.
110 This thesis asserts that, even 
though some questions arose with respect to the justifiability of the US armed response 
against Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom was sufficiently supported by law and state 
practice to be assessed as legal. 
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A legal qualification of the Afghan conflict and OEF 
The next issue is that of a legal qualification of the conflict. From the perspective of 
international law, a qualification is necessary in order to decide what rules apply. As 
discussed above, this thesis asserts that an attack from a non-state actor can be assessed as an 
armed attack, and consequently that a military response may be legal based on the concept of 
self-defence.  
When the US chose a military response in October 2001, it is reasonable to assume 
that they departed from the law enforcement model as the only viable option in dealing with 
Al Qaeda and considered itself at war with Taliban-led Afghanistan and Al Qaeda. The US 
received considerable support for this view, and various nations rapidly contributed with 
forces to OEF. NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 as a response to the 
attack and to demonstrate support to the US in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime.  
The question then arises; what kind of conflict was this? This question is interesting, 
because the legal qualification of the conflict is directly related to the determination of which 
rules apply. This, in turn, relates to the status of the insurgents and the legal basis for the 
application of force. 
International humanitarian law generally divides conflicts into two separate categories: 
International Armed Conflicts and Non-International Armed Conflicts.  
An international armed conflict is a conflict between two or more of ―the high contracting 
parties‖.
111 High contracting parties can only be states, thus international armed conflicts are 
conflicts between states.  
The initial operations of OEF arguably qualified as an international armed conflict.
112 
The parties were states (the US and its allies vs. Afghanistan), even though the Taliban 
regime, with a few exceptions, was not widely recognised by the international community and 
did not have a seat in the UN. However, it is undisputed that the Taliban regime was the de-
facto ruler of Afghanistan, and as such was regarded as a state actor. It is widely accepted that 
this phase lasted until the installation of Hamid Karzai as president of the Afghan Transitional 
Administration 13
th June 2002. However, it is possible to argue that within the framework of 
the international armed conflict between Afghanistan and the US and its allies, a non-
international armed conflict was taking place between the US and Al Qaeda.
113 Al Qaeda had 
access to parts of Afghan territory, and operated to some extent in close cooperation with the 
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Taliban regime. However, Al Qaeda was effectively not operating as an agent of the Taliban. 
They were different entities, hence legally distinct. The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) asserted, when dealing with the Balkan wars, that it was possible 
to have several legally distinct conflicts taking place at the same time within the same 
territory.
114 Consequently, this thesis asserts that the Afghan conflict in its initial phase 
qualified partly as an international and partly as a non-international conflict. 
 
The next phase of the Afghan conflict started with the establishment of the Karzai-led 
Transitional Administration in June 2002.  
The legitimacy of the Transitional Administration related to the Bonn agreement of 
December 2001. It provided for an interim Authority to be established in Afghanistan ―upon 
the official transfer of power on 22 December 2001‖.
115 The main purpose of the Bonn 
agreement was to initially establish a transitional authority, then within six months to effect 
the installation of an emergency Loya Jirga and the Transitional Administration until the 
election to the Loya Jirga within two years. The Transitional Administration was, as stated in 
the Bonn agreement, mandated through several UNSC resolutions, most notably UNSC res. 
1378.  
Through the de facto dismantling of the Taliban regime, provisions made at the Bonn 
agreement and the UNSC resolutions relating to Afghanistan in the autumn 2001, arguably, 
the Transitional Administration, not the Taliban, represented the legitimate authorities of 
Afghanistan. Even though the presence of the US military most certainly had similarities with 
an occupation, the situation must be conceived as different from the later occupation of Iraq 
or the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. This thesis asserts that the US and allied forces‘ 
positioning in Afghanistan, from the installation of the Transitional Administration, was 
acting in support of the legitimate Afghan authorities, hence not acting in the capacity of an 
occupying force. 
Since the Taliban and their followers no longer could be regarded as Afghanistan‘s 
legitimate representatives, the conflict no longer qualified as an International Armed Conflict. 
Consequently, there are two legally distinct alternatives: 
1.  The conflict, thus the paradigm of hostilities, had been brought to and end. The 
disturbances caused by the former regime and its followers were considered a 
criminal problem and would be solved through a criminal justice model. Application 
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of military force was an acceptable option only when law enforcement resources were 
incapable of fulfilling their mission (e.g. the position of the British Army in Northern 
Ireland).  
2.  The conflict, thus the paradigm of hostilities, was still ongoing, but its status needed 
to be determined. A military response model was a viable and lawful option of 
combating the opposition. 
 
The factual situation in Afghanistan was, and is, obviously alternative 2. Alternative 2 does 
not rule out a criminal justice model, but will affect the application of force and the status of 
the insurgents. 
This thesis consequently asserts that the Afghan conflict qualified as a non-international 
armed conflict from the installation of the Karzai-led Transitional Administration by June 
2002. 
 
The legal regime applicable to the Afghan conflict in its initial phase 
The GC I – IV regulate conduct in war and the protection of civilians and prisoners of war 
within international armed conflicts. As stated in GC common article 2: 
―In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognised by one of them‖.
116 
“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance‖.
117 
Only states can be ―High Contracting Parties‖ and the view that only interstate armed conflict 
qualifies as an international armed conflict is widely supported both in the academic 
communities and amongst most states. GC I – IV are generally considered to represent 
customary law, and consequently binding to all states with or without their ratification in all 
conflicts of an international character. 
There have been some debate as to whether the GC I – IV applied to this part of the 
Afghan conflict. Whereas their applicability in international conflicts is undisputed, the 
particularities of the Afghan conflict complicated the issue. As the previous discussion 
concludes, the initial phase of the Afghan conflict may, at least partly, qualify as an 
International Armed Conflict. The laws of war, as laid down in the GC I – IV, should 
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consequently apply. Taliban soldiers conducting operations and adhering to the provisions in 
GC III, article 4, would therefore be entitled to Prisoner of War (POW) status if captured, and 
otherwise share rights and duties as specified in the convention, e.g. the status of combatancy. 
The US has not contested this view, but claimed that Taliban soldiers generally operated 
outside the conditions stated in GC II art 4 and consequently did not meet the criteria laid 
down in the convention.
118 Taliban soldiers not adhering to these provisions were 
consequently labelled illegitimate combatants. They did not achieve POW status when 
captured by US or allied forces, nor were they granted protection as combatants. On the 7th 
February 2002, President Bush issued the following guidance: 
  The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban 
detainees, but not to the Al-[Qaeda] detainees. 
  Al-Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. 
As such, its members are not entitled to POW status.  
  Although we never recognised the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, 
Afghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has determined that the 
Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, 
however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs. 
  Therefore, neither the Taliban nor Al-Qaeda detainees are entitled to POW status. 
  Even though the detainees are not entitled to POW privileges, they will be provided 
many POW privileges as a matter of policy.
119 
Parts of the basis for this presidential guidance remains classified, but the US Centre for 
Law and Military Operations suggests that the since Taliban generally did not meet the 
provisions of GC III, article 4, they would not be entitled combatant or POW status.
120 Some 
of these individuals are still assumed to be detained by US authorities, and the question of 
their legal status have been subject to substantial controversy. 
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The legal regime applicable to the Afghan conflict in its second phase  
Whereas International Armed Conflicts are covered by a substantial legal regime, firmly 
supported by state practice, this is not the case for conflicts of a non-international character.
121 
The legal regime covering non-international conflicts are mainly GC I-IV, common article 3, 
and the GC additional protocol II of 1977.  
The main purpose of article 3 common to the GC I – IV is to provide a minimum of 
protection to all participants of conflicts ―not of an international nature‖. It states: “In the case 
of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions …‖ 
122  
Common article 3 is generally accepted as customary law and as such provides a 
minimum of protection to all ―persons taking no active part in the hostilities‖ in non-
international armed conflicts.
123 Melzer makes a strong argument that article 3 applies to all 
armed conflicts not of an international character. The question of interest is whether the 
conflict qualifies as an armed conflict or not. As long as the conflict rises above the threshold 
of ―internal disturbances and riots‖, it may be safely assumed that article 3 will apply.
124 As 
previously discussed, the Afghan conflict doubtlessly rose above this threshold. 
However, the US contested that common article 3 applied to members of Al Qaeda 
based on a view that ―article 3 does not address a gap left by common article 2 for 
international armed conflicts that involve state non-state entities, and it does not reach an 
armed conflict in which one of the parties operates from multiple bases in several states‖.
125 It 
falls outside the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed discussion of the US view, but the 
US view was not widely supported internationally.
126  
In addition to Common Article 3, Protocol II additional to the GC states that its field 
of application is: 
…all armed conflicts …… which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
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territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol.
127 
I will in the following examine five challenges of applying the GC additional protocol II in 
the Afghan conflict.  
First, the additional protocols are not ratified by states to the same degree as GC I – 
IV. The US is not party to all provisions of the additional protocol II, but generally complies 
with the rules as a matter of policy.
128  
Second, its field of application is quite narrow. Melzer argues that: ―the scope of 
application of Additional Protocol II is much narrower than that of Article 3 GC I – IV‖.
129 It 
is explicitly restricted to ―non-international armed conflicts taking place within a state 
between its own armed forces and non-state actors‖. Melzer thus argues that: ―Additional 
Protocol II does not apply when governmental armed forces are confronting non-state actors 
outside of their own territory or when a conflict within a state does not involve its own 
governmental armed forces‖.
130 The scope of Additional Protocol II would effectively rule out 
its applicability with respect to the US-led OEF in Afghanistan.  
Third, the Afghan conflict contained certain characteristics of an international 
character. The opposing fighters entered Afghanistan from neighbouring countries, like 
Pakistan, and they may be of different nationalities. Coll provides a strong argument that an 
intimate relationship existed between the Taliban and the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) 
during the Taliban period.
131 The current modus operandi of the opposing forces indicates that 
there still are connections, even support, between Taliban leadership and Pakistani 
intelligence services. 
According to the Norwegian Judge Advocate General Handbook on IHL, the following can 
result in an internal conflict developing an international character:
132 
  Certain conflicts of liberation 
  Internationalisation through foreign support 
  Control by a foreign state 
Due to the covertness of the opposing forces‘ operations and classification of OEF 
intelligence information, it is difficult to assess the extent of international influence on 
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Taliban operations. However, it is undisputed that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are organisations 
whose operations were not confined to Afghan territory, and that they were internationally 
connected. In the case of the Taliban, authors like Steve Coll has indicated a strong, even 
formalised connection to Pakistan through the Pakistani Intelligence Service, ISI.  
Forth, it is conceivable to define the Afghan conflict within the framework of the US 
Global War on Terror. The phrase ―global‖ immediately indicates a conflict of an 
international nature. One could argue that since the US defines itself as at war with Al Qaeda, 
and OEF was (and is) a part of the US Global War on Terror, the conflict is an armed conflict 
of an international nature. However, ―international‖ by definition indicates a conflict between 
states, which clearly is not the case. The US position on this is not very clear. According to 
Wippman and Evangelista, whilst ―… the Bush administration has stated explicitly what it 
thinks the conflict with Al Qaeda is not, it has been rather vague about what it thinks it is‖.
133 
A more appropriate term could be ―transnational conflict‖ as discussed by amongst others 
Corn and Jenssen and Paulus and Vashakmadze.
134 As mentioned above, the ICRC also 
presents serious doubts as to whether it is possible to define a conflict ―against a loosely 
connected clandestine network‖ as a party to a conflict.
135 Even though the US-led Global 
War on Terror has an explicitly transnational character, it seems inappropriate to apply this as 
an argument for classifying the Afghan conflict as an international armed conflict.  
Fifth, we must consider the composition of the ISAF and OEF forces. Both ISAF and 
OEF are operations with international participation. Whereas OEF were, and are, 
predominantly American, 40 nations currently contribute to ISAF. However, it is doubtful 
whether this would affect the qualification of the conflict. OEF was, at least after June 2002, 
conducted with the consent of the legitimate Afghan authorities and the opposing forces did 
not represent any accepted state or legitimate political entity. Neither state practice nor 
judicial literature supports a view where international contributions in support of the 
legitimate government would internationalise the conflict in the legal sense.  
Whereas the above discussion demonstrates that GC Additional Protocol II cannot be 
applied to the Afghan conflict in its entirety, it contains several provisions that are considered 
customary law applicable to armed conflicts in general. The ICRC list of customary rules of 
IHL includes, amongst others, the provisions of GC Additional Protocol II article 4 on 
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humane treatment and article 13 on protection of the civilian population.
136 In addition, the 
2006 Sanremo protocol and the ICRC study on customary law of 2005 identify several areas 
of IHL that are considered customary law applying to all conflicts outside the initial scope of 
the treaties.
137 Consequently, in addition to GC I – IV Article 3, this thesis asserts that the GC 
Additional Protocol‘s provisions regarded as customary law applies to the Afghan conflict 
and OEF.  
 
Status of the insurgents and the legality of the use of force 
One of the main aspects of IHL is to separate combatants from non-combatants. Combatancy 
is a status that applies to members of states‘ armed forces.
138 In principle, only combatants 
may be legally targeted within the framework of an armed conflict, and they uphold certain 
rights and obligations as stated in the GC.
 139 Personnel who are not combatants are defined as 
civilians and are protected according to IHL. 
However, combatancy as a status giving certain rights and duties to individuals only 
applies to certain categories of individuals inside the framework of an armed conflict. 
According to Dahl, these are:
140 
  Members of states‘ armed forces (with certain exceptions, such as medical personnel 
and chaplains). 
  Members of resistance movements (on certain conditions). 
  Participants in spontaneous resistance against an invasion. 
Even though IHL allows for certain categories not belonging to states‘ armed forces to be 
defined as combatants, the conditions stated in the GC will normally deny these categories 
such status in most contemporary conflicts. GC additional protocol II, Article 1 effectively 
denies groups like Al Qaeda the status of combatancy . 
Whereas the Taliban soldiers may have been covered by the provisions of GC I-IV 
during the conflict‘s initial phase, the same did not apply to members of other organised 
armed groups, like Al Qaeda operatives. Al-Qaeda, as a non-state actor and not a ―High 
Contracting Party‖, did not benefit from the same regulations that apply to combatants. States 
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are generally not inclined to grant insurgents status as combatants, amongst other reasons 
because this would most probably give them a status that would be contradictory to state 
interest. Al Qaeda operatives would then logically be deemed civilians, and their violent 
activities subject to criminal proceedings. The legal term of such activities can be found in 
GC AP II, article 13, stating that ―Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities‖.
141 The right of armed forces 
to target civilians that take direct part in hostilities (DPH) in an armed conflict is undisputed. 
The point of departure for the following discussion is, consequently, that members of 
private armies like Al Qaeda and also the Taliban in the conflict‘s second phase were civilians 
that could not legally use force to obtain their objectives. 
From the perspective of law, this leaves two items of interest with regards to the status 
of the insurgents, namely the paradigm of hostilities and the definition of civilians directly 
participating in hostilities.
142 In the following, I will present a general overview of the legal 
assessment of the Afghan conflict with respect to the status of the actors and proceed to the 
discussion of the paradigm of hostilities and civilians that are DPH. 
 
The paradigm of hostilities 
As the above discussion demonstrates, IHL does only apply inside the paradigm of hostilities 
as opposed to that of law enforcement. In cases covered by the law enforcement paradigm, 
domestic law and Human Rights Laws (HRL) are applicable, whereas these regulations are of 
lesser, though not totally without, interest to situations of armed conflict. In order to decide 
whether IHL applies, it is necessary do decide whether the situation rises above the threshold 
of an armed conflict.
143 This is particularly important because it is generally recognised that 
there is a lower threshold for the use of force within the paradigm of hostilities than that of 
law enforcement.
144 This thesis asserts that the Afghan conflict rose above that threshold, and 
that consequently, the particular provisions of IHL applying to armed conflicts would apply 
pending the qualification of the conflict as either international or non-international. That does 
not mean that every act of violence within the Afghan conflict would qualify as hostilities. 
Acts of violence, which would normally be assessed as criminality, will not necessarily 
change status even if they occur within the framework of an armed conflict. Melzer thus 
argues that only acts of violence directed against a military adversary may be assessed as 
hostilities: ―Even in contexts generally governed by the law of hostilities, the use of force 
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against persons protected against direct attack must, therefore, comply with the stricter 
standards of the law enforcement paradigm‖.
 145 
Given this argument, government and coalition forces in Afghanistan may not apply 
military force against civilians conducting criminal activities as they would against 
individuals or groups conducting hostilities. They have, as Melzer states, to comply with the 
stricter standards of the law enforcement paradigm. 
However, the factual situation on the ground complicates the distinction between the 
paradigm of hostilities and that of law enforcement. In situations of armed conflict, it may 
sometimes be highly difficult to distinguish between acts of crime and hostile acts. The 
Afghan conflict displays several incidents where the distinction between criminal activities 
and hostile acts are blurred or even impossible to discern. Even though the principal rule 
indicates that a particular activity would be considered an act of crime, thus belonging to the 
law enforcement paradigm, the circumstances of the Afghan conflict provides a strong 
argument for defining a variety of such actions within the paradigm of hostilities. Because of 
the potential legal ambiguity of such situations, it is highly relevant to define or assess which 
activities may be said to constitute hostile acts. 
A civilian firing his weapon against the opposing forces will most clearly be assessed 
as engaging in hostilities. That individual can thus be targeted within the self-defence 
paradigm or. However, the definition of hostilities may not be as straightforward as this 
example depicts. The frequent cases of roadside bombs and suicide attackers in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan provide a case for an expanded definition of hostilities. The question is whether 
the perpetrator has to ―pull the trigger‖ himself in order to conduct hostilities, or if preparing 
or planning an attack is sufficient. International law has no clear answer to this, but it is 
generally assumed that the closer the perpetrator is to the ―triggerman‖, the more likely it is 
that his or her actions may be deemed hostile. Melzer argues that both attacks and certain 
activities preceding the attack may be addressed by the law of hostilities, and as such be 
covered under the provisions of IHL.
146 Consequently, the emplacement of a roadside bomb 
will most probably constitute an act of hostility. The making of the bomb and the 
transportation of the bomb to its intended place of use may also constitute an act of hostility. 
However, sheltering the maker of the bomb may in most cases be considered to be a criminal 
act, thus not constituting a hostile act, and should consequently be addressed in accordance 
with the law enforcement paradigm. 
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Civilians directly participating in hostilities (DPH) 
The problem that armed forces often face when engaging non-state actors participating in 
hostilities is what is normally termed the revolving door problem. A typical example would be 
an individual who works as a school teacher during the day and engages in an insurgency at 
night-time. GC additional protocol II, article 13, states that ―Civilians shall enjoy protection 
afforded by this part, unless for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities‖.
147 From a 
legal perspective, the definition of ―for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities‖ is not 
a precise definition. States, the ICRC and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
(IIHL) at Sanremo have made efforts to resolve the problem.
148 As the case stands, I will use 
the ICRC policy of defining DPH on the one hand (restrictive approach) and Israeli practice 
on the other hand (broad approach) to exemplify the problem.  
According to researcher Nobou Hayashi at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, the 
ICRC is advocating a restrictive approach.
149 A restrictive approach will typically be a literal 
appreciation of the term take direct part, namely that an individual is DPH only when he is 
directly and actively engaged in an act assessed to be hostile. Typical examples would be 
firing, or obviously preparing to fire his or her arm, preparing explosive devices ―on the 
premises‖ for their intended use and so on.
150 The restrictive approach would rule out 
targeting the previously mentioned school teacher during the day-time. A restrictive approach 
would further indicate that leaders and planners doing staff work cannot be targeted when 
they are not performing their principal activities of conducting war fighting. 
On the other hand, the Israeli Supreme Court did rule in favour of the Israeli Defence 
Force (IDF) allowing for direct targeting on terrorist operatives.
151 First, the court found that a 
state of armed conflict exists between Israeli and Palestinian terrorist organisations. Then it 
found the conflict to be of an international nature. Terrorist operatives were considered 
unlawful combatants, and as such could not claim protection as being civilians. The court 
eventually decided:  ―The law of targeted killing is determined in the customary international 
law, and the legality of each individual such act must be determined in light of it‖. The court 
found that the principles on which targeted killings rested was those of protecting civilians, 
military necessity and proportionality.  
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The consequences of the Israeli Supreme Court decision were that it would not be 
possible for a terrorist or insurgent to change status frequently. If he or she is an active 
participant in an organisation connected with terrorist activities, he or she can be targeted as 
long as the connection to such activities is firmly established. The individual cannot claim 
protection according to IHL, and can be targeted in accordance with the principles of military 
necessity and proportionality.  
Naturally, both the ICRC and Israeli approach present important challenges. The 
ICRC approach does not resolve the revolving door problem, whereas the Israeli approach 
creates important challenges regarding the legal protection of individuals. 
 
It remains undisputed that civilians lose their protection according to IHL when they are DPH. 
The key question is defining DPH in terms of what activities may constitute hostilities, as 
well as their duration. As the discussion above demonstrates, there is a disagreement within 
the international community between those advocating a restrictive approach and those 
supporting a wider approach. The basis for when military forces may or may not apply force 
will be the operation in question‘s Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and targeting procedures.
152  
However, states do not interpret international law similarly; one will find some states 
advocating a narrow approach and others advocating a wide approach to DPH. In a coalition 
operation like OEF, states may introduce national restrictions on their own forces that may not 
be in line with the overall ROEs for the operation.  
DPH is a fundamental term in this thesis. In non-international armed conflicts, it is the 
term that forms the basis for every decision on whether to apply force. The key questions, 
which are not properly solved within judicial literature or by state practice, are the duration of 
DPH and which activities may influence individuals being labelled DPH. Whereas 
combatancy is a status based on individuals‘ membership in a state‘s armed forces, the 
membership approach bears little or no validity for non-state actors. Non-state actors are, by 
definition, civilians, and can only be targeted for the time they are labelled DPH. This thesis 
asserts that the use of military force outside the law enforcement paradigm may only be used 
against protected persons for the time they are labelled DPH. The Rules of Engagement and 
targeting procedures should consequently be based on an assessment on what constitutes 
hostilities and the notion of DPH.  
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Rules of Engagement and their use 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the common way of regulating the use of force in 
contemporary military operations, whereas targeting is a process that includes selection, 
approval and ultimately the use of force against individuals, infrastructure or other target 
categories. It is ultimately the ROEs and the targeting process that may allow for the use of 
force. ROE‘s serves mainly two purposes; ensure operational effectiveness and that the use of 
force is compliant to international law.
153 
The ROEs and the subsequent targeting process are precisely where law and 
operations connect, typically in a counter insurgency campaign like the Afghan conflict. 
Whereas the use of force in an international armed conflict is legitimate against an adversary 
based on his membership in a state‘s armed forces, the use of force in a Counter Insurgency 
campaign must comply with the stricter rules as previously demonstrated by this thesis. 
Consequently every effort to apply force outside mere self defence will be supervised by 
lawyers assuring compliance to IHL.
154  
When military forces assess whether force may be applied, their point of departure 
will normally be to examine the set of ROEs. Most NATO members apply the NATO 
definitions as defined in the Military Committee (MC) document 362. MC 362 defines a set 
of ROEs that may be authorised for NATO operations, and that in principle function as a 
guideline when NATO members develop nation-specific ROEs.
155 MC 362 defines the 
purpose of ROEs as: ―Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the authorisation for, or limits on, the 
use of force during military operations‖
156 
However, OEF was a US-led operation, indicating that US definitions would apply. 
The US Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines ROEs as: ―Directives issued by competent military 
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces 
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called 
ROE‖.
157 
Usually, ROEs will be developed for a specific military operation or theatre. The US has 
developed a Standing ROE (SROE), defined below: 
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  ―SecDef-approved standing rules of engagement (SROE) that implement the inherent 
right of self-defence and provide guidance for the application of force for mission 
accomplishment‖. 
  ―Fundamental policies and procedures governing action to be taken by US force 
commanders during all military operations and contingencies‖.
 158 
There are, broadly speaking, two reasons for developing ROEs.
 159 One is to allow for the 
precise use of force in order to achieve the desired objectives. The second is to restrain the use 
of force, in order to prevent violations of domestic and/or international law and national or 
alliance policy. The point of departure for developing ROEs may thus be one of the 
following:  
  Use of force in military operations is assumed to be unrestricted from the outset and 
the ROEs main purpose is to restrict it.  
  Use of force (outside the scope of self-defence) is assumed to be prohibited and the 
ROEs define the circumstances and describe the nature of force that may be applied. 
Force may consequently only be applied where it is explicitly authorised.  
The ROEs will usually be accompanied by rules regulating authorisation. Whereas the 
authorisation of relatively mild use of force - such as the checking of cars for weapons or 
detaining personnel - may be delegated to lower level commanders or even individual 
soldiers, the use of lethal force would normally require authorisation at senior military or even 
at political level. State practice, even for NATO members, is pending national policy and is 
not necessarily synchronised. ROEs are usually classified and will never be published for 
ongoing operations. 
 
The issue of legality: conclusion 
Whereas international law is well developed in international armed conflicts, the legal basis 
for non-international conflicts is less developed. In addition, there is some controversy about 
the qualification of conflicts. The US-led Global War on Terror exemplifies this, mainly 
because the term ―global‖ indicates that it has certain attributes resembling an international 
armed conflict. According to David Wippman: 
It is not at all clear that international humanitarian law, whether treaty or custom, 
countenances the notion of a global, transnational armed conflict that is neither 
international in the traditional sense of a conflict between two or more states or non-
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international in the traditional sense of a conflict between a state and insurgents 
operating from within its territory.
160 
This thesis argues that the level of violence in the Afghan conflict clearly exceeded 
what can be deemed as internal disturbances and tensions. Consequently, it qualified as an 
armed conflict in the legal sense. The thesis argues that the conflict qualified partly as an 
international and partly as a non-international conflict in its initial phase. It further argues that 
the Afghan conflict after the fall of the Taliban qualified solely as a non-international armed 
conflict. Insurgents, not having status as combatants, would be covered by certain provisions 
of IHL, mainly GC I-IV article 3 and those provisions of GC additional protocol II that are 
considered customary law. In addition, the non-derogable rights of HRL will always prevail.  
Since non-combatants will be protected according to IHL, their targetability is subject to 
whether they engage in activities that will deny them this protection; Direct Participation in 
Hostilities. The issue of DPH is of relevance both with respect to the type of activities that 
may qualify as hostilities and the duration the individual will retain this labelling. This thesis 
argues that both direct hostile acts and certain activities preceding the actual attacks may 
constitute acts of hostility, thus allowing the individual in question to be labelled DPH.  
Finally, the procedural tools used by military organisations to allow for the use of 
force are the ROEs and the targeting processes. It is generally acknowledged that these 
procedures must comply to international and domestic Law, e.g. as stated in the NATO 
Document MC 362/1, ROE: ‖Formulation of ROE is influenced by a variety of factors. ROE 
first must be lawful. International law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during 
military operations‖.
161  The targeting process is also closely supervised by legal advisers in 
order to avoid violations of international and domestic law. This thesis argues that at the core 
of the application of force in non-international armed conflicts outside the scope of self 
defence lies the notion of DPH, hence the notion of DPH should be reflected in the procedural 
tools used by the military to allow for the use of force.  
As a final comment on the issue of non-state actors and their status in armed conflicts, 
it is clear that the existing legal regime does not grant non-state actors, not being recognised 
as a legal party to the conflict, rights as combatants. There is currently no inclination in state 
practice to allow the Taliban, Al Qaeda or other opposing forces such rights.  
 
 
                                                 
160 Wippman and Evangelista, eds, New Wars, New Laws, p.18. 
161 NATO, MC 362/1, 30 June 2003.   50 
Section Two: the Norwegian discussion and decisions 
Introduction to Section Two 
The previous section aimed at establishing a theoretical framework wherefrom the issues of 
legality may be discussed. In Section Two I aim to present the Norwegian discussion and 
decision-making process as it appeared in Government, Parliament, the Military and in the 
media, focussing on issues related to the legality of armed force against non-state actors. As 
will be demonstrated, the Norwegian political discussion did not to any degree explicitly 
focus on the impact of using armed force against non-state actors. Apart from a few articles 
more broadly addressing International Humanitarian Law, this particular issue was almost 
absent in the Norwegian discussion. However, the consequence of the Norwegian decision to 
participate in Operation Enduring Freedom was acceptance of the use of armed force against 
non-state actors based on a military response model. As the previous section indicates, such 
use of force is controversial.  
As discussed in Section One, acts of violence may be categorised either as a judicial 
issue (crime or the combating of crime) or within the legal framework addressing armed 
conflicts (the paradigm of hostility). Violence as a function of crime will normally be pursued 
by a judicial response, based on domestic law, and is interesting to the international 
community insofar as it does not violate International Human Rights law. As opposed to 
criminal law, the use of armed force is highly politicised - to use Clausewitz phrase: ―the 
continuation of politics but with other means‖. The political aspect of the use of armed force 
may complicate the application of law. However, it is commonly accepted that the use of 
military force outside the scope of mere self-defence requires a legal justification.
162 The main 
aim of the empirical section, therefore, will be to present and analyse the main parts of the 
discussion and decision-making process as it actually happened in Norway, regarding the 
provision of support to, and consequent participation in, Operation Enduring Freedom in view 
of the conceptual background in Section One.  
Section Two will be divided into two chapters. The first chapter will start with a short 
examination of the Norwegian post-2WW experience regarding military operations and use of 
force. Norway‘s post-2WW military experience is of interest for the later analysis of the 
Norwegian discussion and decision-making process that concluded with participation in 
Operation Enduring Freedom. I will then introduce the political situation in Norway from 
September 2001 until the end of 2002 in order to facilitate an understanding of the discussion 
and decision-making process that will be presented in chapter two. 
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I will present my findings in the second chapter. As mentioned above, there are few 
references directly related to the status of the insurgents in Afghanistan, even though non-
state actors like Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are mentioned on numerous occasions. It 
may thus be argued that the status of the insurgents were of minor interest regarding 
Norway‘s support to the US and Operation Enduring Freedom. However, if this were the case, 
it may also be argued that an important issue of Norwegian support to, and participation in, 
this conflict was not properly addressed. Findings of interest to this thesis, therefore, must be 
those that in some way influenced the Norwegian view on the legality of use of armed force 
against non-state actors. Consequently, not only statements from Governmental officials, 
leading politicians and the military, but also articles and media-coverage discussing the use of 
force in general are of particular interest. I therefore aim at presenting the relevant part of the 
discussion as it appeared in governmental papers and press releases, in Parliament and in the 
media. I will in particular search for arguments, discussions and topics that may be connected 
to international law. This will provide an empirical basis for analysing to which extent issues 
of legality actually figured in the Norwegian discussion and how they were treated in the 
decision-making process.  
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Chapter Two; Norwegian use of force and the political landscape  
A short look at Norwegian history and the use of force 
This thesis argues that partly the Kosovo conflict, but in particular the participation in OEF, 
was a marked departure from Norwegian post-2WW traditions with respect to the use of its 
armed forces.  
Norway has since the end of the Second World War satisfied its security requirements 
from three distinct avenues. As a small nation, Norway saw itself best served by a strong 
international legal system, restricting stronger states‘ opportunities to recourse to force. The 
UN Charter thus provided the first line of defence for Norwegian security needs.  
Prior to WW II, Norway considered neutrality as the best way to avoid being subject to an 
armed attack. The German attack in 1940 and its consequent occupation provided sufficient 
arguments for leaving the idea of neutrality in favour of a military alliance. The second 
avenue of providing security to Norway was thus provided by the NATO alliance.  
Finally, Norway developed strong links to the US as a third line of defence, in case the 
UN Charter or NATO would prove to be insufficient. 
Subsequently, the Norwegian post-2WW view on the use of force may be derived 
from its requirement for a strong UN and its orientation towards NATO and the US. This left 
application of Norwegian military force to either: cases of national emergencies, e.g. in case 
of an armed attack on Norway or NATO allies; or: UN-led peace-keeping missions.  
The strategic importance of NATO‘s Northern Flank and the relative weakness of the 
Norwegian military made Norway a net importer of NATO- and US-provided security. At the 
core of the Norwegian defence planning was the invocation of NATO‘s article 5 in case of a 
Soviet attack. This was regularly exercised during the 70s and 80s with large-scale NATO 
exercises in Northern Norway. The main purpose of the Norwegian armed forces, in case of 
an attack, was to provide sufficient ―holding-time‖ for NATO and US reinforcements to 
deploy into the area.
163   
Outside the paradigm of the supreme emergency, UN peace-keeping missions became 
the only acceptable option. Norway was a firm supporter of the UN, and saw itself best served 
by a strong international legal system based on the UN-charter. The Charter‘s article 2(4), 
prohibiting the use of force, was perceived as a fundamental guarantee to avoid acts of 
aggression. Norway was consequently a substantial supporter of UN peace-keeping missions.  
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Arguably, Norway based its security requirements on a combination of a strong 
international legal system provided by the UN, alliance obligations based on its membership 
in the NATO-alliance and finally its bilateral relationship with the US.  
Simultaneously, Norway developed an idea, or self-image, as a ―peace-nation‖.
164 In 
particular, Norway was inclined to support the UN-system in order to create the conditions for 
peace in a number of conflicts. As an example, the Norwegian politician Eirik Solheim, in the 
capacity as special advisor to the Norwegian foreign office, was highly active in the Sri 
Lankan peace negotiations during the late 90s and early 2000s. Neither the Norwegian 
perspective on what served Norwegian security interests best, nor the idea of Norway as a 
―peace-nation‖, did fit very well into the concept of NATO conducting offensive out-of-area 
operations, or the idea of the Military transformed to a expeditionary corps. 
Then, the Kosovo conflict and Operation Allied Force came about. Whereas the earlier 
operations on the Balkans had been conducted with a UN-mandate, NATO‘s attack on Serbia 
24
th March 1999 had not. It was not a peace-keeping ―blue helmet‖ operation, and it soon 
became apparent that this was war fighting on a scale not seen in Europe since the Second 
World War. Similarly, it was clear that Norway supported the operation and would actively 
participate by deploying F-16 fighter aircraft to Italy. The Norwegian political discussion 
relating to this operation is quite interesting. As demonstrated above, the Norwegian view has 
traditionally been what is now labelled the ―UN-track‖. The ―UN-track‖ boasts relative 
political consensus in Norway. Most political parties will argue that it is in Norway‘s interest 
to adhere to the UN when use of force may be an option, as the discussion preceding the 
second Iraq conflict displayed.
 165 Unilateral use of force or ―alliances of the willing‖ have 
never been popular within the Norwegian political establishment or in the Norwegian popular 
opinion. Arguably, there is also a greater inclination within the political left to be in favour of 
the use of force when it is clearly mandated through the UN Security Council.
166  
Operation Allied Force represented to a large degree a breach of this tradition. Before 
and during the operation, even representatives of the political left argued intensively in favour 
                                                 
164Cf. Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, speech held at the Norwegian Peace Centre, 24 april 2006: Norway as 
a peace-Nation, myth or reality, Original text: Norge som fredsnasjon – myte eller virkelighet: 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/utenriksminister_jonas_gahr_store/taler_artikler/2006/norge-som-
fredsnasjon--myte-eller-virkel.html?id=273461>, accessed 16 September 2009. 
165 Bergens Tidende, Interview with Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, 17 October 2002, Norway would 
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166 Norwegian News Agency, 31 December 2002, Only the Socialist party and the centre Party opposes 
Norwegian participation in the Iraq war, original text: Kun SV og Senterpartiet sier absolutt nei til norsk 
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of the operation in view of the alleged ethnic cleansing taking place in Kosovo at the time.
167 
As such, political statements contributed to the legitimisation of an operation whose legality 
could be questioned. Operation Allied Force may have introduced a sense of realism in 
Norwegian foreign policy with regards to the use of force, which had not previously been 
very apparent. It became obvious to the Norwegian public and political community that there 
were shortfalls within the UN system that in some circumstances could legitimise the use 
force outside the ―UN-track‖. It may thus be argued that the Kosovo experience was 
instrumental in preparing the Norwegian authorities and Military for subsequent international 
operations like those in Afghanistan. 
Whereas the Kosovo-conflict served as an eye-opener with respect to contemporary 
conflicts and the role of the Norwegian military, the Afghan conflict marked a departure from 
the Norwegian post-2WW tradition. For the first time since WWII, Norwegian forces were 
put in a position where they were likely to use force outside the paradigm of mere self-
defence in regular military, even offensive operations.
168 
In 2005, the Centre – Conservative coalition lost the election, and a coalition between the 
Labour Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist Party was formed. The new administration 
(called Stoltenberg II) reintroduced the ―UN track‖ as the desired option and by 2006 
withdrew Norway from OEF.
169  
 
The Norwegian political landscape 
Norway is a constitutional monarchy based on the parliamentary system. The Government is 
dependent on parliamentary support and election for Parliament is held every fourth year. 
Presently, seven parties are represented in Parliament.
170 The current Cabinet is composed of 
a coalition of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party and the Norwegian Centre Party, popularly 
named Stoltenberg-II since the current Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, also occupied the 
position 17th March 2000 to 19th October 2001 (Stoltenberg-I). The current coalition boasts 
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accessed16 September 2009. 
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majority in Parliament, whereas earlier Cabinets normally did not enjoy such support and had 
to seek political support in Parliament on a case-by-case basis.  
The Cabinet does not, as a rule, have extensive executive powers, nor can it veto 
Parliamentary decisions. However, foreign policy is assumed to be the domain of the 
Government, though it is to some degree customary that Parliament is consulted in issues of 
major national importance.
171 Use of military force outside Norwegian boundaries, such as 
active support to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, would constitute an obvious case 
where the Cabinet consults Parliament.
172 
The 2001 election for Parliament was held on the 10
th September. The Cabinet at the 
time was pure Labour (Stoltenberg-I), but the Party lost the election. Consequently, at the 
time of the 9/11 incident, the Labour Government was in transition to opposition. The new 
Cabinet was inaugurated 19
th October 2001. It consisted of a coalition of parties from the 
political centre and the Conservatives.
173 The Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, came 
from the Christian Democratic Party, whereas the Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen, and 
Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, were Conservatives. This was Bondevik‘s second 
time as Prime Minister; hence the administration was named Bondevik-II. Bondevik‘s 
previous term as Prime Minister was from October 1997 until March 2000.
174 Bondevik thus 
had gained some experience in dealing with armed conflicts from the Kosovo conflict.  
What could be expected from the new administration, and did it indicate a change in 
Norwegian Foreign Policy with respect to the ―UN track‖ or alliance obligations? By the time 
of its inauguration, the 9/11 incident and the US operations in Afghanistan were still major 
political issues. As will be shown, both the outgoing Labour Government and the new 
coalition strongly condemned the 9/11 attacks and uttered substantial support to the US 
actions in Afghanistan. By the time of its inauguration, the newly elected Government did not 
in any way indicate that its policy would depart from that of the previous Government with 
respect to the US and the fight against international terrorism. However, as will be shown, 
representatives of some parties criticised both the US actions in Afghanistan and the 
Norwegian support to OEF. 
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Chapter Three: the Norwegian discussion and decision-making process 
 
The changing character of war and the Norwegian discussion 
In Section One; this thesis argues that the character of war has changed. War, as understood 
within the Napoleonic concept - as massive armies facing each other on the battlefield - ―no 
longer exist‖ according to General Sir Rupert Smith.
175 This thesis argues that predominant 
contemporary war does not fit the Napoleonic concept of war. It argues that there are 
qualitative differences between the Napoleonic concept of war and most contemporary 
conflicts. In particular, this relates to the complexity of the conflicts and to the status of the 
actors, of which many are non-state. It asserts in Section One that contemporary conflicts, in 
particular in view of the changing character of war, affect the application of International 
Humanitarian Law. 
The Norwegian perception of contemporary war by the time of September 2001 will 
serve as an introduction to the later discussion on legality. As will be shown, it seems like the 
political leadership makes a distinction between war and armed conflict, reserving the former 
term for international armed conflicts. The main aim of this chapter will be to identify 
whether the Norwegian political and military leadership comprehended the complexity and 
particularities of the military actions taken after the 9/11 incident, hence if this situation posed 
particular challenges regarding use of force and legality from a Norwegian perspective.  
 
The Military 
To what extent was the novelty of the Afghan conflict appreciated by the Norwegian military? 
Did appreciation of this novelty in turn translate into a thorough examination of the legal 
issues that may derive from such an understanding? An official Norwegian appreciation of the 
changing character of war may typically be found in official statements from the Ministry of 
Defence, the Defence Staff or the Norwegian Operational Headquarters, in doctrinal 
documents, and in material used at military academies. In addition, statements related to 
particular incidents, such as the 9/11 incident and the ―War on Terror‖, may indicate the 
presence of such an understanding. 
A natural place to start is to examine the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational 
Doctrine of February 2000.
176 This doctrine was issued only a short time after the Kosovo 
conflict and Operation Allied Force. By this time, Norway had actively supported the Kosovo 
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campaign with fighter aircraft and had been involved in both the UN and NATO operations in 
the Balkans during the 90s. 
The Norwegian Doctrine of 2000 touches upon various forms of war in part A, chapter 
2, ―Conflict and Military theoretical basis‖, including interstate war, civil war, irregular 
warfare and asymmetry.
177 However it does not discuss these topics in any depth. The 
doctrine defines irregular war as: ―A war where some or all major parties do not wage war in 
the same way that we do, that is, not by the same doctrines as us‖
178 Similarly, it defines two 
forms of asymmetry: technological and organisational. Organisational asymmetry is defined 
as: ―A war where the warring parties have substantial differences in the way they organise and 
use their military forces‖.
179 
In paragraph 2.13, the Doctrine discusses various forms of warfare.
180 The opening 
sentence in this paragraph states that: ―Even though all warfare employs both firepower and 
mobility, these elements constitute the basis for two distinct forms of warfare, namely 
attrition, which places main emphasis on firepower, and manoeuvre, which places main 
emphasis on mobility.‖ 
The doctrine arguably indicates that the approach preferred by the Norwegian military 
is the manoeuvrist approach, by focusing on manoeuvre warfare and how it may best be 
conducted. Similarly, the Doctrine‘s part 2, Operations, discusses how to apply the principles 
of manoeuvre warfare in combat. It is quite obvious that the Norwegian Doctrine of 2000 
emphasises the conduct of major war within the Napoleonic paradigm. Its main focus is the 
application of regular military formations in a fight against similar organisations. It is possible 
to argue that the principles of manoeuvre warfare may also be applied outside the scope of 
major war. This is of course true. Manoeuvre theory may be applied against a wide range of 
opponents. However, the Doctrine does not emphasise Counter-Insurgency campaigns like the 
Afghan conflict. Rather, it describes large-scale formation warfare against similar opponents. 
Its focus is on the battle and how to win it. It may therefore be argued that the Norwegian 
doctrine of 2000 did not, at least in any depth, reflect the particularities of protracted warfare 
against a non-state actor that is highly difficult to distinguish from the civilian population.  
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Did this mean that the Norwegian military leadership was unaware of the 
particularities of such warfare? According to General Sigurd Frisvold, it was obvious merely 
a few days after the 9/11 incident that Norwegian military contributions in support of the US 
might be required. Consequently, the military leadership promptly initiated a fact-finding 
process on the 13
th September 2001, in order to identify capacities that Norway could offer in 
support of the US if requested by the Norwegian Government. Frisvold particularly 
mentioned the experiences gained during the Kosovo conflict, and the restructuring of the 
Norwegian military that had been ongoing for some time, as important factors for the 
identification of useful military capacities within a very short timeframe.
181 The military 
leadership focused mainly on reacting fast in order to be able to provide useful military 
capacities to the Norwegian political leadership in case a US request materialised. Frisvold 
stated that when the process of actually preparing military capacities gained speed later in the 
autumn of 2001, his main focus was to physically prepare the forces and to equip them with 
robust Rules of Engagement and targeting procedures. According to Frisvold, categorising the 
type of conflict he was about to embark upon was mainly left to the political authorities.
182  
Frisvold indicated that by autumn 2001, there was an awareness within the Military 
that the ongoing restructuring and the recent experiences from the Balkans had been valuable 
in preparing the Norwegian armed forces for the participation in conflicts such as OEF. 
Frisvold did not mention whether the presence of two simultaneous but legally distinct 
conflicts was assessed with respect to the Norwegian policy on application of force. However, 
he stated that substantial effort was made in developing ROEs and targeting procedures, thus 
indicating an appreciation of the challenges represented by the Afghan theatre. However, the 
restructuring of the Norwegian military during the late 90s was predominantly a function of 
alliance obligations rather than a deeper analysis of the possible types of conflicts Norway 
would encounter. In particular, and Frisvold mentioned this during the interview, it was 
unfortunate that the Norwegian Air Force had not been able to contribute in Operation Allied 
Force with Air-to-Ground capacities. Norway‘s restructuring programme did therefore 
emphasise developing capacities that would enable cooperation with, and in support of, its 
major allies, in particular the US. 
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The political leadership 
To what degree did the political leadership comprehend the particularities of the conflict they 
were about to enter? This is a difficult question to answer. There are few, if any, open sources 
that explicitly address the particularities of using the Norwegian military in conflicts where 
the opposing actors are predominantly non-state. Terms derived from an appreciation of ―The 
Changing Character of War‖ seemed to be reserved to the academic communities and, to 
some degree, the Military.  
First, it is of interest to examine the general Norwegian appreciation of what may 
constitute war. The issue of whether the Afghan conflict actually constituted a war was 
subject to some discussion in Norway in the autumn of 2007, especially due to Norwegian 
losses in Afghanistan. This may serve as an example of the political thinking on this issue. 
When Norwegian politicians were asked about the status of the Afghan conflict, for example 
whether Norway was participating in a war, they tended to apply a legalistic approach to the 
problem by addressing the fact that Norwegian war legislation was not activated and that 
there was no state of war between Norway and Afghanistan.
183 Being a party to a war has 
obvious legal consequences. For example, the Norwegian Judge Advocate General stated that 
since the Norwegian wartime legislation was not implemented, Norway was not at war in a 
legal sense.
184 The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness law of 1950 referred to by the Judge 
Advocate General, often mentioned as the War Law, mainly deals with the issues of how to 
handle major national emergencies resembling that of the German attack on Norway April 9
th 
1940.
185 
Others, who do not apply a legal definition, may label a conflict war based on, for 
example, the annual number of casualties.
186 Labelling the conflict might be of mere 
theoretical interest, but as briefly discussed in the introduction, contemporary war may not 
coincide with the popular notion of war. Whereas there was little doubt that Norwegian 
Forces conducted war-like operations in Afghanistan, both Governmental and Parliamentary 
representatives upheld that Norway was not at war. A typical example may be found in a 
statement made by the Norwegian Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen, who in an 
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interview in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet explained that one reason for not labelling 
the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan as war, was that ―war is a state of conflict 
between states‖.
187 Similarly, in an interview in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten 6
th 
November 2007, the Norwegian Minister of Defence was reluctant to label the Afghan 
conflict, and especially the Norwegian involvement, as war.
188  
Apart from the legal issues, there was no enthusiasm in the political community for 
admitting that Norway was participating in a war. The implication of the phrase ―war‖ seemed 
to be all too negative to actually use it. 
The above statements are from 2007. However, governmental statements, press 
releases and speeches still indicate that by September 2001, the view on what represented war 
was changing. This mainly depends on three factors. 
First, the 9/11 incident was, as previously demonstrated, frequently referred to as an 
act of war. Both the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time of the 9/11 attacks, Jens 
Stoltenberg, and Foreign Minister Torbjørn Jagland, described them as acts of war, and stated 
that the US had every right to react in self-defence. Later in the autumn of 2001, the newly 
elected Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, addressed the Norwegian Parliament stating: 
―The terror attacks the 11th September was a declaration of war. It was a declaration of war 
against the international judicial order, against international relations, against the free and 
open society, and against human dignity itself‖
189 By this time, it was clear that there were no 
traditional warring parties, no formal declaration of war, nor conventional armies involved.  
Second, most statements appreciate the presence of a non-state actor. Whereas war has 
usually been perceived as an interstate activity, the non-state actor of Al Qaeda was rapidly 
identified as the perpetrator of an act of war. In an article in the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten 26
th September 2001, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Torbjørn 
Jagland stated that ―We must stick together in the fight against international terrorism‖.
190 In 
this article, Jagland argued that the US president had equalled the terrorist attacks to acts of 
war against the US, and stated that the US would initiate any counter-efforts deemed 
                                                 
187 Dagbladet, 10 November 2007. Interview, Minister of Finance, Mrs Kristin Halvorsen. 
188 Aftenposten 6 November 2007. Interview, Minister of Defence, Mrs Anne-Grete Strøm Erichsen. 
189 Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, addressing Parliament 8 November 2001. Original text: 
Terroranslagene mot USA 11. september var en krigserklæring. Det var en krigserklæring mot den 
internasjonale rettsorden, mot internasjonalt samkvem, mot frie og åpne samfunn, mot toleranse, og mot selve 
menneskeverdet. Whereas both Prime Minister Bondevik and other leading politicians referred to the 9/11 
incident as a declaration of war, this must be understood as rhetorical expressions. It could not be understood 
as legal statement, as e.g. alluding to a formal state of war between Norway and Afghanistan in conjunction 
with the later Norwegian military support to OEF. 
190 Aftenposten, Article by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torbjørn Jagland, 26 September 2001. Original text: Vi 
må stå sammen i kampen mot internasjonal terrorisme.   61 
necessary. Jagland indicated the presence of an international terrorist network in general and 
pointed in direction of Osama bin Laden in particular. He stated that the UN Security Council 
resolution 1368 made clear that the 9/11 incident threatened international peace and security, 
a phrase commonly accepted to lead to additional Security Council resolutions that more 
explicitly legitimised the use of force. 
Third, whereas war fighting has traditionally focused on winning battles, political 
statements indicate an appreciation of this not being a war predominantly for the battlefield. It 
required a wide range of actions, for example political, economical, judicial or military. 
Hence, Foreign Minister Jagland stated in an article in Aftenposten 26
th September 2001 that: 
Apart from pure military means, the US is working on a long-term strategy against 
international terrorism based on a wide spectrum of political, diplomatic, judicial and 
economical means. This is a wise and considered strategy that we from the Norwegian 
side fully support.
191  
Similarly, in a speech to the Norwegian Parliament 8th November 2001, Prime Minister 
Bondevik stated that: 
The fight against terrorism must be conducted with a range of political, diplomatic, 
judicial and financial instruments. Regrettably it is also necessary to use military 
instruments. The Taliban regime has not cooperated with the international community 
in prosecuting those responsible of the 11
th September attacks, but instead acted as 
their supporters.
192 
 
Conclusion: the Changing Character of War and the Norwegian appreciation  
By the time of the 9/11 incident, Norway‘s most recent military experience was that of the 
Balkan theatre. As stated by General Frisvold, the Balkan experience had contributed 
substantially to the development of the Norwegian military in a way that made it more useful 
in international and alliance operations. Even though the military doctrine at the time was 
predominantly focused on manoeuvre warfare and large formation war-fighting, it may be 
argued that the Norwegian Military was conceptually cognisant of the challenges posed by the 
upcoming Afghan conflict. In either case, the main military emphasis was not on the character 
                                                 
191 Ibid. Original text:  Utover rene militære tiltak arbeider USA med en langsiktig strategi mot internasjonal 
terrorisme, basert på et vidt spekter av politiske, diplomatiske, juridiske og økonomiske virkemidler. Dette er 
en klok og gjennomtenkt strategi som vi fra norsk side støtter fullt ut. 
192 Bondevik, addressing Parliament 8 November 2001. Original text:  Kampen mot terrorisme føres med 
politiske, diplomatiske, rettslige og finansielle virkemidler. Dessverre er det også nødvendig å bruke militære 
virkemidler. Dette fordi Taliban-regimet ikke har villet samarbeide med det internasjonale samfunn om å stille 
de ansvarlige for angrepene 11. september til ansvar, men istedenfor opptrer som deres støttespillere. 
   62 
of the conflict, but on the preparation and provision of capacities that were politically useful 
and in line with alliance obligations and requirements. The issue of law connected to the use 
of military force against non-state actors did not attract much attention within the Military. 
Similarly, political statements of the autumn of 2001 indicate a common appreciation 
of the conflict that arose as a result of the 9/11 attacks that was very different from the 
perception of war as an interstate conflict fought by regular armies. The frequent references 
to, and clear acceptance of, the US claim of self-defence connects with the Norwegian 
emphasis on use of force as a viable option only when it is supported by provisions of the UN 
Charter. In addition, what Norway perceived as alliance obligations is instrumental in 
interpreting the Norwegian reactions. 
Though not explicitly addressed, it seems that the political leadership at the time 
appreciated the novelty of the situation and the practical challenges that might follow from 
this. However, the available sources do not suggest that the political leadership addressed in 
any depth the challenges that may result from such an understanding of war. In particular, the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda were not mentioned in a way that indicated an appreciation of these 
actors as operationally and legally distinct. 
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The Norwegian discussion and legality 
 
Introduction 
This thesis argues that the use of force may only be legitimate if it is authorised through an 
internationally approved legal system. As such, it assumes that state sovereignty is 
insufficient as a legal basis for the application of military force. Police use of force is only 
legal insofar as it is executed in accordance with domestic law and not violating the state‘s 
international obligations, such as non-derogable Human Rights. A similar approach may be 
used regarding states‘ use of military force. However, as discussed in Section One, whereas 
domestic law usually is quite precise in regulating police use of force, states‘ use of military 
force is not subject to similar precision. Arguably, international law is by nature highly 
politicised. It subsumes treaty and customary law with state practice and state behaviour. The 
rise of international judicial bodies, such as the ICC and the ICJ may restrain states‘ use of 
force, but has not moved states‘ use of force from the political arena to that of the courtroom.  
This thesis argues that there are seldom major disagreements about the rules; they are 
accepted by most states. The differences between states materialise predominantly in the 
interpretation of the rules, and disagreements regarding the facts. It is therefore a major 
challenge when dealing with international law, that just to refer to it in general - which was 
frequently done by Norwegian leading politicians - does not necessarily provide clarity in 
which rules actually apply and how the state intends to comply with them.  
As mentioned above, the Norwegian discussion before and during the country‘s 
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom contained numerous references to international 
law. The importance of international law was frequently insisted upon by Norwegian officials, 
particularly when discussing the use of force. Norway is a signatory to all major conventions 
regulating the use of force and has incorporated most of its international legal obligations in 
domestic law. However, what may be questioned is the extent to which the obvious rhetorical 
focus on law actually translated into the decision-making process regarding use of force.  
I aim in the following to present the Norwegian discussion as it happened in the 
Government, the Military, the Parliament and in the public sphere, and connect it to the 
decision-making process. Of particular interest is to identify the role legal issues played in the 
decision-making process. 
Derived from the discussion in Section One, the main issues related to the use of armed 
force against non-state actors are the following: 
  Did the 9/11 attack constitute an act of aggression in the Norwegian perception?    64 
  A legal qualification of the conflict from a Norwegian perspective? 
  The conflict and the actors, the Norwegian approach. 
  Rules of Engagements (ROEs) and Targeting:  
o  How did Norway define hostilities? 
o  The revolving door issue.  
 
Did the 9/11 attack constitute an act of aggression in the Norwegian perception?  
In Section One, I discuss the UNGA resolution 3314, Definition of Aggression, as a 
commonly accepted definition of what constitutes an armed attack, thus justifying an armed 
response against the perpetrator. Was the 9/11 attack perceived as an armed attack by the 
Norwegian Government?  
Norwegian officials apparently appreciated the novelty of the circumstances that 
caused the conflict in Afghanistan. Even if the US was not attacked by a state entity, the sheer 
volume and cruelty of the incident immediately resulted in comments indicating the presence 
of a war or war-like situation. As Foreign Minister Torbjørn Jagland stated in Verdens Gang 
(VG) 12
th September 2001: ―This is modern war against democracy‖.
193 
The first official comments indicated a similar appreciation of the 9/11 attacks as acts 
of war. The ―war‖ analogy was used on numerous occasions. 
In a press release on the 11
th September 2001, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated 
that: ―this is an attack on the US and the American people.‖
194 Arguably, the intent of this 
press release was to present the first official Norwegian statement of the incident. The phrase 
used by the Norwegian Prime Minister indicates that he perceived the incident as an act that 
went beyond crime. ―Attacking the US and the American people‖ arguably translates as an act 
of war. Similarly, Foreign Minister Torbjørn Jagland in an article in Aftenposten referred to 
the UNSC resolution 1368, which made it clear that the incident was assessed ―to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security‖ and that it ―confirmed the US right to self-
defence‖.
195 
A few days later, Jagland, addressing the Oslo Military Society, elaborated further on the 
attack and its possible consequences. In this speech, he again referred to UNSC resolution 
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1368 as a verification of the US right to invoke self-defence as stated in the UN-charter article 
51. Jagland claimed that: ―There is consequently no demand for additional authorisation or 
mandate from the UNSC for the US to, alone or in coalition, apply armed force against the 
perpetrators of the act of terrorism‖
196   
The Prime Minister‘s office stated in a press release dated 4
th October 2001; ―the US 
has an obvious right to self-defence. This is anchored in international law, in the UN Charter 
and through decisions in the UN Security Council‖.
197 
Senior Advisor at the Department of Defence (DoD), Judicial Section, Jarl Erik 
Hemmer claimed that the connection between Taliban and Al Qaeda was assumed to be 
sufficiently strong to allow for the US attack to be directed against the Taliban regime.
198 
There was ―no doubt‖ within the DoD that the attack was sufficient to invoke self-defence by 
the US. According to Hemmer, it has also earlier been accepted that attacks by non-state 
actors have been accepted as sufficient as to justify self-defence, although he did not mention 
any examples of this. The 9/11 attacks almost immediately caused a ―state acceptance‖ of its 
constituting an armed attack. 
Similarly, Assistant Director General in the Judicial Department of the Foreign Office, 
Martin Sørbye, stated that; ―both the Foreign Office and the Department of Defence shared 
the view that there was a solid basis in international law to respond against Afghanistan based 
on the right to self-defence.‖
199.  
Both Hemmer and Sørbye underline the speed at which things were happening in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 incident, indicating that legal assessments were partly done under 
substantial time pressure. They both indicate that the almost complete unanimity between the 
judicial departments and the political authorities reduced the necessity for more in-depth 
judicial considerations. What was assessed as most important was to clarify the Norwegian 
position as the situation developed. Speed was of the utmost importance. Both Hemmer and 
Sørbye claimed that this information was forwarded up through ―the chain of command‖. 
Statements from General Frisvold also indicate that the cooperation between the legal sections 
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and the political and military leadership was quite close.
200 Given the unanimous statements 
from the senior bureaucrats, it seems highly likely that assessments on whether the 9/11 attack 
constituted an act of aggression were discussed at the political level and formed a part of the 
basis upon which the Norwegian Government made their statements.  
The Norwegian Parliament did not convene after summer holiday before the 10
th 
October 2001. Consequently, the Norwegian Parliament did not discuss the issue of the 9/11 
attack in any depth in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 incident. However, the 
Parliamental Extended Committee on Foreign Affairs stated already on the 13
th September 
2001 that they fully supported the US.
201 The chair of the Parliament‘s Foreign Committee, 
Einar Steensnæs, made it clear that Parliament supported the Government and accepted 
Norwegian obligations towards NATO.
 202 He stated that; ―a united Parliament is behind the 
US. But we presuppose that the US reaction will be in accordance with International Law‖.
203  
Based on the interviews with representatives of the bureaucracy and statements from 
leading politicians, it seems quite clear that the official perception of the 9/11 attack was that 
it constituted an act of aggression, and thus an armed attack. 
Did any diverging viewpoints materialise regarding whether the 9/11 attack actually 
constituted an act of aggression?  
As mentioned above, there was almost complete unanimity within the Government 
and the bureaucracy. However, some criticism or objections were raised by Members of 
Parliament and the representatives of the academic community.  
Both the Socialist Party and the Centre Party expressed objections to the possibility of 
the US embarking on a war against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and in particular objected 
to the potential Norwegian support for such actions.
204 At the core of the objections to a 
military response seem to be a perception of the 9/11 attacks being predominantly a criminal 
action that should be dealt with within the law enforcement paradigm, not militarily.  
Members of Parliament (MP) of the Socialist Party, Ågot Valle and Audun 
Lysbakken, expressed ―substantial scepticism‖ towards the Norwegian support to the US. 
Their main concern was that Norway could be involved in a military NATO operation.
205 
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Similarly, MP of the Centre Party, Rune Skjælaaen, stated that he thought Norway should 
have voted against NATO implementing its article 5. On the 15
th September, it became clear 
that the leader of the Socialist Party, Kristin Halvorsen, had signed a petition against 
Norwegian support to ―US revenge actions against innocent civilians‖.
206 
Similarly, some representatives of the academic communities of law and international 
relations expressed doubts as to whether the 9/11 incident actually constituted ―an act of 
aggression‖ as defined by the UNGA.   
Already on the 21
st September 2001, Professor of Law at the Institute of Public law at 
the University of Oslo, Geir Ulfstein, indicated that the US right to self-defence was 
questionable, insofar as self-defence could only be invoked against states, not a non-state 
actor.
207 The 9/11 attack should be perceived as a criminal action, requiring a judicial 
response, not a military counter-attack. Ulfstein argued that the principles of immediacy, 
necessity and proportionality did not allow for self-defence actions. Finally, Ulfstein argued 
that UN Security Council resolution 1368 did not provide the necessary authority to use 
military force against Afghanistan.  
Professor Jørgen Aall at the Institute of Jurisprudence at University of Bergen 
discussed the difference between self-defence and revenge in an article in Bergens Tidende.
208 
Aall argued that, apart from in situations of a major national emergency, such as an invasion, 
it could not be up to the state in question to decide whether an act could invoke the right to 
self-defence. Aall indicated the necessity of direct or indirect state involvement in order to 
invoke self-defence. His main argument was that the UN Charter‘s article 51 presupposes the 
presence of an armed attack or act of aggression by a state. The UN Charter provides strict 
and precise conditions for invoking self-defence, and Aall questioned whether these 
conditions were present in such a way that a US attack on Afghanistan was justified. 
However, Aall also indicated that the 9/11 attacks was of a magnitude that could influence the 
interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter in favour of the US response.  
Since both Ulfstein and Aall argued that armed conflicts required the presence of a 
state on both sides, they questioned whether the Al Qaeda attack constituted an act of 
aggression. These viewpoints found some support among other debaters as well, like 
Professor of International Politics Nils A. Butenschøn, who claimed that ―an organisation or 
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individual cannot wage war in the legal sense‖.
209 A similar view was presented by the bishop 
of Oslo, Gunnar Stålsett; ―This is international crime, not war. It is a distinction that is 
fundamental to hold on to‖.
210 
Additionally, it is possible to identify widespread scepticism against attacking 
Afghanistan on the political left. In a market research published by Aftenposten 11
th October 
2001, it was stated that the Socialist, Centre and Liberal Parties contained a majority that was 
against the US attack on Afghanistan.
211  
Finally, the public discussion, as it was presented through the media, clearly indicated 
a popular perception of the 9/11 attack as an act of aggression.  
The Norwegian database A-text contains all editorial content from most Norwegian 
newspapers. The A-text database allows for combining various search words in order to 
identify the amount of articles containing those words. 
By combining ―Afghanistan‖ and ―war‖, a total of 2,470 hits were presented for the 
timeframe between 12
th September 2001 to 30
th June 2002. In comparison, by combining 
―Afghanistan‖ and ―crime‖ only 77 hits are presented. Similarly, by combining ―terrorism‖ 
and ―war‖ a total of 1,234 hits were presented, whereas ―terrorism‖ and ―crime‖ presented 
only 143 hits.
212 With a few exceptions, the majority of the articles on terrorism and war or 
terrorism and crime were connected to the Afghan conflict. A closer scrutiny of the content of 
these articles reveals that the 11/ 9 incident most certainly was also perceived as a criminal 
action, not only as an act of war, but the sheer volume of war rhetoric was overwhelming. 
The newspaper most clearly advocating a divergent view on the conflict was 
Klassekampen.
213 The newspaper, representing the political left, was a major contributor of 
viewpoints that diverged from the official policy. During the initial phase, Klassekampen 
presented 370 articles, editorials etc. that included both ―Afghanistan‖ and ―War‖, ranging 
from mere descriptive articles to explicitly criticising the US-led operations.
214  
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An analysis of the Norwegian perception 
Arguably, the Norwegian official perception of the 9/11 attack was that it constituted an act of 
aggression, thus an armed attack on the US, which justified the US in initiating military 
operations against the perpetrators. The official perception was to some extent challenged, but 
the challenge did not gain much momentum and basically remained restricted to the political 
left. In addition, whether the 9/11 attack actually constituted an act of aggression was 
questioned by some representatives of the academic community. Was the definition of 
aggression a part of the Norwegian discussion or decision-making process? 
The definition of aggression requires a conflict between states. As stated in its Article 
1; ―aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another state‖.
215 The Norwegian official policy on the 9/11 
incident seemed to contradict this. Official statements leave little doubt that the incident was 
perceived as ―an act of aggression‖.  
Article 2 and 3 of UNGA resolution 3314, though also requiring state vs state 
conflicts, more precisely addresses the kind of actions that may constitute an armed attack. In 
particular, Article 3 defines acts that may qualify as acts of aggression, of which some clearly 
resemble the 9/11 attacks. As such, there may be isolated arguments within the Definition of 
Aggression that support the view that an attack by a non-state actor is an armed attack. 
However, neither the governmental nor the public discussion contained substantial traces of 
discussions about the UNGA resolution 3314. Arguably, it did not form a substantial part of 
the Norwegian discussion, even though some debaters, mainly belonging to the scholarly 
community, touched upon related arguments. 
The Norwegian Government argued almost entirely in favour of the 9/11 attack as 
constituting an armed attack because of its magnitude and consequences. Whether the idea 
that actions by a non-state actor may constitute an armed attack has developed to be 
commonly accepted state practice may be questioned. However, this was clearly the position 
of the Norwegian Government in the autumn of 2001. 
 
Legal qualification of the conflict: the Norwegian perspective 
The previous paragraph establishes Norway‘s position as perceiving the 9/11 attack as an act 
of aggression. Acts of aggression may justify a forceful reaction as an act of self-defence. The 
Norwegian view was that US use of military force against Afghanistan was justified based on 
the perception of the 9/11 attack as an armed attack. The question then arises, what kind of 
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armed conflict did the US embark upon on the7
th October 2001, supported by several nations, 
including Norway?  
In Section One, this thesis argues that the conflict‘s first phase was as a combination 
of an international armed conflict (US and allies vs Taliban) and a conflict of a non-
international character (US and allies vs Al Qaeda). It then continued as a conflict of a non-
international character from the establishment of the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. 
Qualification of the conflict is a prerequisite for deciding what rules apply. As discussed in 
Section One, there is a distinction between the rules applicable to conflicts of an international 
character and conflicts of a non-international character. Arguably, the rules regulating 
conflicts not of an international character are far less developed than the former. Additionally, 
the Afghan theatre was by its nature highly complicated regarding the various actors involved. 
It did not fit neatly into the international legal system regulating armed conflicts. 
By the 30
th November 2001, Norway officially pronounced that it would offer military 
forces in the fight against international terrorism.
216 The forces were offered to OEF and the 
area of interest was Afghanistan. As such, the qualification issue became one of practical 
importance. Norwegian soldiers could soon be in a position facing Taliban soldiers and/or Al 
Qaeda operatives. 
The question then arises: how was the issue of legal qualification dealt with in the 
Norwegian discussion and decision-making process? 
 
7
th October 2001 until June 2002 
The first phase of the Afghan conflict started with the US attack, 7
th October 2001. The attack 
was a direct response to the 9/11 incident. The US claimed it was a self-defence action taken 
in order to prevent further hostile activities from the perpetrators of the attack. The US 
position received widespread support from most states, including Norway. In Section One, I 
argue that the initial phase actually contained two partly merging but legally distinct conflicts, 
one of an international character against the Taliban and one of a non-international character 
against Al Qaeda and its supporters. From the perspective of the soldier on the ground, this 
may not be a meaningful distinction; in Afghanistan it would have been highly difficult to 
separate the two on the battlefield. However, from a legal point of view, the difference is of 
utmost importance. Taliban soldiers, being members of one of the warring parties‘ armed 
forces, would from the outset classify as combatants. However, the status of combatancy 
would not apply to members of Al Qaeda, so targeting those would at least theoretically imply 
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a different set of ROEs. Targeting an Al Qaeda operative would require positive identification 
beyond what is required for combatants, based on whether the individual operative was 
―directly participating in hostilities‖. 
The previous paragraph clarifies the Norwegian position as perceiving the 9/11 attack 
as ―an act of aggression‖, justifying an armed response on behalf of the US and consequently 
NATO. The next step will logically be to discuss the Norwegian view on the type of conflict 
that emerged 7
th October 2001 in order to clarify the prerequisites for the later Norwegian 
support to and participation in Operation Enduring Freedom.  
First of all, the sheer volume of war-related rhetoric, both in the form of political statements 
and in newspapers, indicated an appreciation of an armed conflict, not a law enforcement 
operation. For the timeframe between 12
th September 2001 and end of June 2002, the A-text 
database displays a total of 2,470 articles, editorials and press statements that combines 
―Afghanistan‖ and ―War‖. In comparison, only 77 combine ―Afghanistan‖ and ―crime‖. The 
previous paragraphs also show that war analogies were used frequently by Norwegian 
politicians when describing the 9/11 incident.  
The US attack on the 7
th October did not change the political rhetoric. In a press 
statement issued the same day as the attack, Prime Minister Stoltenberg stated that: ―The US 
executes its obvious right to self-defence according to the UN Charter. It is clear that Osama 
bin Laden and his network of terrorists conducted the cruel attacks on the US 11
th 
September.‖
217  
As a result of the election on the 10
th September 2001, the new administration was installed 
19
th October with the inauguration of the Bondevik-II administration. In his speech to 
Parliament 26
th October 2001, Foreign Minister Jan Petersen argued along similar lines as the 
previous government. He stated that: ―Both the US and any other country that is hit by 
international terrorism has an obvious right to execute self-defence. This is in accordance with 
international law, and made clear through UNSC resolutions‖.
218 In the same speech, Petersen 
stated: ―Norway fully supports the military operations. Osama bin Laden cannot be fought 
without the use of military force‖. 
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Both the previous and the new government argued along similar lines. Phrases like 
―self-defence‖ and ―military operations‖ were frequently used, though statements explicitly 
naming the conflict ―war‖ were rare.  
This thesis argues that the Afghan conflict could qualify as two simultaneous but 
legally distinct conflicts in its initial phase. Official statements do not add much clarity on this 
matter. Official statements do not suggest a perception of the Afghan conflict as one of an 
international character and one of a non-international. They basically refer to the right to self-
defence, the support to the US and the initiation, presence and necessity of military operations 
in Afghanistan. Based on the official statements, it may be argued that once the operations 
had started, Norwegian politicians did not separate between Taliban and Al-Qaeda with 
respect to ROEs or targeting. As an example, Prime Minister Bondevik stated in an article in 
Aftenposten 15
th November 2001: ―The terrorist network of bin-Laden and Al Qaeda must be 
destroyed. The initial aim presented itself. Afghanistan could not remain a protected space for 
terrorists that plan mass murder of civilians around the world.‖
219 
Later in the same article, Bondevik discussed the necessity of removing the Taliban 
regime and presented among others a legal argument for doing that by pointing in the 
direction of UNSC resolutions. 
The Minister of Defence at the time, Kristin Krohn Devold, has stated that she 
consistently used ―Military operation mandated by NATO‖ when describing the operations.
220 
In her reply to my questionnaire, she did not address the issue of a legal qualification of the 
conflict. The main issue was to ―get the job done‖ in order ―to create peace under as secure 
conditions for Norwegian soldiers as possible‖. When asked if she assessed it to be a 
sufficient legal foundation for initiating military operations against Afghanistan, her reply was 
―It was a crystal clear agreement both within this and the former Government that the legal 
conditions were present for executing military operations against Afghanistan‖. The legal 
foundation was, according to Devold, a major issue prior to assessing Norwegian 
contributions.
221  
Some clarity may be provided by representatives of the bureaucratic level. According 
to Jarl Erik Hemmer, the Norwegian view did not differ from that of ―most states‖ in that the 
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conflict was assessed to be an international armed conflict until the summer of 2002.
222 Then, 
from the establishment of the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, the conflict changed into 
one of a non-international character. Hemmer did not mention to which extent these issues 
were explicitly discussed with the political leadership of the Department of Defence, or to 
which extent they were addressed as part of the decision-making process. However, he 
strongly indicated an almost complete unanimity within the political leadership and between 
the judicial departments of the DoD and the Foreign Office in their view that the conditions 
for self-defence, thus a US armed response, were unquestionable.  
Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Judicial Department, Martin 
Sørby emphasised that Afghanistan - a subject of international law - provided protection and 
even active support to Al Qaeda. The Norwegian assessment was that; ―the right to self-
defence was executed in response to the violation of international law that Afghanistan or 
Taliban had committed by giving Al Qaeda the possibility to operate‖.
223 Sørby made no 
comments that could indicate whether the possible legal duality of Afghan conflict in its 
initial phase was discussed. 
A third source of information is The Norwegian Parliament. The Parliament did 
address various issues related the 9/11 attack and the US reactions to it. However, none of 
these touched specifically upon the qualification of the conflict, even though several Members 
of Parliament raised more general issues related to international law.  
In the parliamentary session 26
th October, Parliament discussed the 9/11 incident and 
the subsequent US response. Prime Minister Bondevik addressed Parliament, stating that: 
―The military operations that the US currently is conducting are supported by a wide range of 
states, they are a legitimate defence according to international law and the UN Charter, and 
are confirmed by the UNSC‖.
224 
In the discussion following the Prime Minister‘s speech, several members of 
Parliament addressed the possible consequences of aerial warfare in Afghanistan, the 
possibilities and consequences of collateral damage, and the possibility of the US use of 
cluster munitions. 
Former Foreign Minister Jagland, now in the capacity as Member of Parliament, stated 
in his speech that responding against Afghanistan was necessary in order to incapacitate the 
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terroristic networks of Al Qaeda: ―What is the alternative to military operations, my remark? 
The alternative is to sit and wait until these networks and groups may continue to operate 
from Afghanistan and wait for the next attack‖.
225 
In her reply to Jagland the leader of the Socialist Party, Kristin Halvorsen, questioned 
what may be perceived a successful outcome of the acts of war initiated against Afghanistan. 
In her reply, Halvorsen asked how: ―citizens not originating from Afghanistan, but from 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, inspired and trained by bin-Laden‖ would be rendered harmless by 
bombing Afghanistan.
226 Even though Halvorsen‘s analyses of the connection between Al 
Qaeda and Taliban may be questioned, her reply indeed indicated an appreciation of the 
complexity of the Afghan conflict.  
Apart from some appreciation of the Afghan theatre consisting of a state actor 
(Taliban) and a non-state (Al Qaeda), Parliament did not address the issue of the qualification 
of the conflict. To the extent that international law was mentioned, it was only as a general 
reference as stated by, for example, the Prime Minister; ―according to international law‖.
227 
Finally, the public discussion may reveal additional viewpoints regarding the 
classification of the conflict. The public discussion would of course not have been a part of 
the decision-making process as such, but neither government nor Parliament may be assumed 
to be untouched by the discussion in the media. This may be particularly valid if viewpoints 
were put forward by influential debaters belonging either to the media itself or to influential 
academic communities. Bjørn Jacobsen, MP of the Socialist Party and member of the 
Parliamentary Defence Committee, especially pointed in direction of Geir Ulfstein‘s criticism 
of the 9/11 attack as sufficient for invoking self-defence, citing it as an important and 
influential proponent of his own view on the conflict.
228  
Norwegian newspapers touched upon the issue of the different actors on several 
occasions. There were numerous references to Al Qaeda, Osama bin-Laden and the Taliban. I 
have previously established the connection between the 9/11 incident, the Afghan theatre and 
the perception of an armed conflict. There were some discussions as to whether this was 
actually the case. However, the sheer volume of articles connecting the Afghan conflict with 
the term ―war‖ suggests that the popular perception was that this was a war-like situation, not 
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a police-type mission. From there on, the discussion regarding the categorisation of the 
conflict was almost non-existent. Available sources do not suggest perception of two legally 
distinct conflicts requiring separate legal bases. Hence it may be argued that neither the public 
discussion nor the political process at the time addressed the possible judicial duality of the 
first phase of the Afghan conflict and Operation Enduring Freedom. 
 
 
 
June 2002 until December 2002 
By the establishment of the emergency Loya Jirga and the installation of Hamid Karzai as 
interim President, it is commonly accepted that the conflict ceased to have an international 
character. From this point in time, the conflict, at least from the perspective of international 
law, consisted of non-state actors violently opposing the legitimate Afghan governmental 
forces and their allies, hence qualifying it as a non-international conflict. From the 
establishment of the emergency Loya Jirga, the Taliban would no longer be in a position 
where they could be accepted as combatants. Since the conflict now could no longer be 
assessed as two simultaneous, but legally distinct conflicts, the situation became one of less 
complexity from a legal viewpoint. At this point in time, Norway was also firmly established 
as an active supporter of Operation Enduring Freedom and had already deployed various force 
contributions to Afghanistan, among others, Special Forces units. In addition, the preparations 
for the Norwegian F-16 Fighter Aircraft contribution were quite advanced, with the aim of 
deploying the aircraft by the 1
st October 2002.
229  
The political discussion indicated that the Afghan conflict was still perceived as an 
armed conflict. There are few, if any, indications that the fall of the Taliban regime and the 
establishment of the provisional Afghan administration under the provisions of the Bonn 
declaration changed the perception of the conflict. 
In a feature article in VG, 13
th September 2002, Defence Minister Devold addressed 
the progress achieved in the fight against terrorism under the heading ―The long war‖.
230 
In a press release 27
th September, Defence Minister Devold stated that the most 
important task of the Norwegian F-16s was to ―deter future acts of terrorism and contribute to 
a stable situation in Afghanistan‖.
231 In the same press release, it is stated that ―the task of the 
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F-16s will be to support allied forces on the ground and that they may be used in combating 
Al Qaeda and Taliban groups and their infrastructure‖.  
2
nd October 2002, Prime Minister Bondevik addressed the situation in Afghanistan in 
the newspaper Vårt Land. The heading of the article was; ―Norway is fighting a war against 
international terrorism‖.
232 In this article, Bondevik stated that this is not a war between 
Norway and Afghanistan. Norway is combating international terrorism by participating in 
military operations in Afghanistan. He continued; ―If it is necessary to bomb military targets 
in Afghanistan – active Al Qaeda and Taliban groups, their bases, infrastructure and 
equipment, thorough procedures according to Norwegian policy will be executed before 
bombing is approved‖. 
Finally, Defence Minister Devold addressed the judicial basis for the war in 
Afghanistan in a MoD comment on the 14
th October 2002. In this article, she argues that the 
war in Afghanistan is conducted in accordance with all necessary provisions of international 
law.
233 Again it is referred to as ―the war in Afghanistan‖. 
Even though the Prime Minister emphasised expressions like ―combating international 
terrorism‖ and ―participating in military operations‖, the Norwegian official perception of the 
conflict seem not to have changed substantially. During the first phase of the conflict, it may 
be argued that the conflict consisted of two simultaneous but legally distinct conflicts. This 
was obviously not the case after June 2002. As such, when Norwegian officials were 
discussing Al Qaeda and remnants of the Taliban in the same sentence, not making a 
distinction between the two, it seems more appropriate than in the first phase. However, it is 
difficult to see a change in the political leadership‘s perception of the conflict from phase one 
to phase two.  
From the perspective of the bureaucracy, it seems that there was an appreciation of the 
changing character of the conflict. Hemmer stated that from the perspective of the DoD, the 
conflict ceased to be of an international character by the establishment of the emergency Loya 
Jirga and the consequent election of Hamid Karzai as preliminary president in June 2002.
234  
The Norwegian Parliament did not discuss this issue in any detail. There is a continued 
concern by some MPs on the issue of Norwegian soldiers being put under the command of the 
US and that the US did not share the Norwegian view on some issues of international law. For 
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example, MP Åslaug Haga of the Centre party, on the 8th May 2002, asked about the possible 
consequences of Norwegian soldiers being under US command and the US not being a part of 
the Landmine convention.
235 There are other discussions on whether the use of military means 
served a purpose. In particular, representatives of the Socialist Party are sceptical towards the 
use of military force in general and Air Power in particular. When addressing these issues in 
Parliament, they often argued in favour of emphasising a law enforcement response as 
opposed to the military operations conducted within the framework of OEF. However, 
available sources suggest that the Norwegian Parliament did not explicitly discuss the 
qualification of the conflict and the possible consequences thereof.  
 
Analysis of the Norwegian perception of the qualification of the conflict  
A legal qualification of the conflict is an issue of a certain judicial complexity requiring in-
depth knowledge of international law that could not be expected to be discussed publicly with 
some precision. The political discussions seem to confirm this. The statements referred to 
above are mostly policy statements from leading politicians that rarely contain in-depth 
analysis of the situation; they just refer to what may be perceived as official government 
policy. It can hardly be expected that complicated issues of international law are discussed in 
such statements.  
However, assessments that at least touched upon the qualification issue seem to have 
been made at the bureaucratic level at the Foreign Office and the MoD. They indicate that the 
Norwegian view on the conflict that emerged 7
th October 2001 was that it was one of an 
international character. According to Martin Sørby at the Judicial Department of the Foreign 
Office, it was a common perception that the US claim of self-defence was directed against 
Afghanistan, being a subject of international law, because of their support to the perpetrators 
of the 9/11 attack.
236 Statements from the bureaucratic-level judicial experts indicate a 
perception that invoking self-defence was justifiable since there was a presence of a state 
entity, the Taliban regime. In addition, Hemmer of the MoD argued that self-defence may be 
invoked against a non-state actor as well.
237 However it seems, based on the information 
provided by the judicial department of the Foreign Office, that the Norwegian view was that 
self-defence was invoked against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and that the operations 
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against Al Qaeda came as a result of the international armed conflict between the US and its 
allies versus the Taliban. 
Statements from leading politicians to some extent seemed to contradict this view. As 
the examples above indicate, the political leadership perceived the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a 
conceptual entity from an operational viewpoint, be it in phase one or phase two. Statements 
from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence indicate a 
perception that self-defence was invoked against Al Qaeda and that the toppling of the 
Taliban regime was necessary in order to eradicate the Al Qaeda training facilities in 
Afghanistan. However, official statements do not indicate perception of a distinction between 
Al Qaeda and Taliban requiring different approaches by the Norwegian military, such as 
separate ROEs or targeting procedures. Neither statements from General Frisvold nor Defence 
Minister Devold indicate that different ROEs were developed for use against different types 
of actors based on a perception of two legally distinct conflicts. 
Neither the military leadership nor the political authorities addressed the issue publicly 
and it was not discussed in any depth in the media. The conflict in Afghanistan was generally 
perceived as a geographically limited conflict, not part of a worldwide ―war on terror‖. It was 
legitimised through application of the UN Charter article 51 (self-defence) and subsequent 
UNSC resolutions. If a legal qualification of the conflict was an issue in the decision-making 
process or the political discussion, it never reached the public sphere and was not reflected in 
governmental policy statements. Subsequently, it may be argued that the qualification issue 
did not attract much attention outside the bureaucratic judicial communities and was of minor 
importance in the decision-making process related to the utilisation of Norwegian forces in 
theatre, like ROE development and targeting processes. 
 
The conflict, the actors and identification - the Norwegian approach 
In Section One, this thesis argues that apart from members of the armed forces of the Taliban 
(in phase one); the opposition in Afghanistan consisted of civilians illegally participating in 
hostilities. These actors, by definition, commit crimes when they conduct hostilities, they 
cannot claim the status of, or expect treatment as, combatants in the sense that they cannot 
claim impunity for their violent actions. However, they may under certain circumstances be 
targeted as a part of a military response model ―for the time they actively participate‖. 
Targeting these actors would logically require a different set of ROEs than targeting the 
Taliban. Whereas Taliban soldiers could be targeted by a membership approach, Al Qaeda 
operatives could not. As discussed in Section One, it is highly questionable if the membership   79 
approach is a viable option for non-state actors, and the rules regulating the targeting of non-
combatants is an issue of some legal controversy.  
The Afghan theatre consisted (and consists) of a variety of actors that either actively 
supported the insurgency, were involved in traditional criminal activities like the drugs trade, 
or a combination of the two. Whereas the former may be addressed through a military 
response model, pure crime usually requires a judicial response. In the case of the latter, 
military forces may only be used insofar as law enforcement resources are insufficient, and 
then only in support of the law-enforcement efforts.  
In order to develop a reasonable set of ROEs and targeting procedures, some kind of 
actor analysis thus seemed to be required. How was the actor issue of the Afghan conflict 
handled by Norway? 
I indicate in the previous paragraph that neither the political leadership nor the 
Military distinguished between the Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives for operational purposes. 
The opposition to the US operation was perceived as a conceptual entity. Whereas this was of 
minor consequence in phase two - the opposition then, by definition, consisted only of non-
combatants (civilians) - it was certainly of consequence in phase one. 
According to the Norwegian MoD, the presumption up until June 2002 was that Taliban 
soldiers in principle could satisfy the conditions for being legal combatants. However, again 
according to the MoD, information presented at the time indicated that they did not satisfy 
these conditions and that Norway would consequently not accept Taliban soldiers as 
combatants.
238 In addition, as will be addressed in the following discussion, Norway as a 
minor contributor was not in a position to develop procedures that deviated substantially from 
those of the US. If the US did not separate between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, it would have 
been highly difficult for Norway to implement procedures that allowed for such separation. 
According to General Frisvold, the issue was not addressed in any depth by the 
Military.
239 He did not indicate that the Defence Staff made any attempts to legally or 
operationally separate between members of the Taliban armed forces and Al Qaeda 
operatives. 
Frisvold stated that it was discussed at the political level in the Extended Foreign 
Policy Committee of the Parliament and in the MoD, but not so much by the Military. The 
military priority was to get robust ROEs and targeting procedures that allowed for interaction 
with our allies and took care of own force‘s security. However, Frisvold confirmed that the 
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ROE‘s were designed for war-type operations. Frisvold did not elaborate on, or define more 
precisely, the implications of war-type operations. For the purpose of this thesis, war-type 
operations must be assumed to be qualitatively different from, for example, peace support 
operations, allowing for substantially more robust ROEs. It may consequently be assumed 
that the ROEs allowed for the use of force outside the scope of mere self-defence.  
Available sources suggest that the status of the actors of the Afghan conflict was not 
addressed in any depth by the political authorities or the military leadership. Political 
statements to the media indicate a view on the Taliban and Al Qaeda as an operational entity, 
being termed terrorists or irregulars. If the issue of differentiating between the actors was 
discussed at the political level it certainly did not reach the public sphere. Consequently, it 
may be argued that Norway did not make a substantial effort in analysing the actors with the 
aim of legally or operationally separate the two. Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban soldiers 
were perceived as an entity and no analysis was required in order to develop separate ROEs or 
targeting procedures. 
 
ROEs and Targeting  
In the following, I will discuss the issue of ROEs and targeting in the Norwegian case, and in 
particular examine the issues of defining hostilities and ―for the time they participate‖.  
The Norwegian contribution to OEF consisted of various capacities as mentioned 
above. However, the military units most likely to apply force were the Special Forces and F-
16 contributions. Since most, if not all, information regarding the Special Forces contribution 
is subject to classification, I will mainly use the Norwegian F-16 contribution to exemplify the 
Norwegian case. Whereas the above discussion on the Norwegian case has included 
references to the public discussion, I will in the following only examine the political and 
military internal process. Issues of ROEs and targeting seldom reached the public sphere, and 
were addressed on a very few occasions mainly related to the issue of collateral damage.  
The Norwegian units participating in Operation Enduring Freedom were put under US 
command as an integral part of the operation, though with some national restrictions imposed. 
Those restrictions were (and are still) classified, but neither General Frisvold nor the 
Norwegian MoD have indicated any major departures from OEF procedures or ROEs, though 
the Norwegian policy was less permissive than the US‘ in some circumstances.
240 Norwegian 
policy, when entering operations like this, has traditionally been to comply with the operation 
in question‘s already established ROEs - as long as they did not depart from Norwegian 
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policy, were in accordance with Norwegian interpretations of international law and otherwise 
in accordance with Norwegian international obligations. This, apparently, was the case also 
for OEF. In a message from the Norwegian DoD to the Defence Staff summer 2002, it is 
stated that Norway had not developed national ROEs.
241 Similarly in a reply to MP Åslaug 
Haga April 2002, the Defence Minister underlines that ―the common Rules of Engagement 
applicable to the forces are examined and accepted by Norwegian authorities‖.
242 The 
implication would be that Norway had accepted and adhered to the ROEs already established 
for OEF.  
However, according to both Krohn-Devold and Frisvold, developing ROEs had high 
priority when it became clear that Norway would actively contribute to OEF. Krohn-Devold 
stated that a thorough process had been conducted in the autumn of 2001, aimed at developing 
robust ROEs that allowed for tight cooperation with US and allied forces, and were in 
accordance with Norway‘s legal obligations.
243 General Frisvold supported this view, 
emphasising the Military‘s focus on developing robust ROEs that would enable Norwegian 
forces to integrate seamlessly into OEF operations.
244 It is not clear whether this meant that 
Norway at some point in time aimed at establishing a set of national ROEs or just assessed the 
ones already established for OEF as appropriate also for the Norwegian contribution, though 
with some adjustments based on national policy. The above statements suggest that the latter 
appreciation is correct.  
According to Colonel Steinar Hannestad who at the time was in charge of the 
Norwegian Defence Command Situation Centre, the main emphasis in the autumn of 2001 
was to prepare Norwegian support to the US as mentioned previously.
245 The initial force 
contributions, such as mine-clearing and CIMIC units, were not supposed to engage in 
offensive operations, thus minimising the requirement for ROEs outside the scope of self-
defence. According to Hannestad, the issue of ROEs, and in particular targeting, gained 
momentum during the spring of 2002 in connection with planning of the Norwegian F-16 
contribution. The F-16s were supposed to support OEF in an Air-to-Ground role in which 
offensive engagements would be likely. In particular, Norway emphasised the necessity of 
positive identification of those individuals or groups of individuals to be engaged before use 
of force was allowed. Hannestad confirmed that this was a prerequisite in order for the 
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Norwegian units to apply force. Hannestad also mentioned that Norway agreed on a list of 
specified target categories, against which a forceful engagement could be effected.  
Whereas Norway applied to the OEF ROEs, though with some restrictions imposed, 
there was a clear focus on developing a national targeting policy. Even though Norway had 
participated in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Norwegian forces had not previously been 
deployed in an offensive posture as was the case for OEF. Deploying Norwegian F-16 to OEF 
made it clear that Norwegian forces could easily come into the position that they had to apply 
force, such as dropping bombs on Taliban or Al Qaeda operatives. Norwegian aircraft had not 
released weapons since the Second World War; hence this would be a novel situation for the 
Norwegian political leadership, the Military and the public opinion. A situation where 
Norwegian F-16s bombed Al Qaeda or Taliban forces inflicting casualties would be one of 
substantial political impact, as actually proved to be the case when Norwegian F-16s attacked 
enemy forces in January 2003.
246 
Whereas ROEs are developed to give guidance on when force may be applied, the 
targeting process deals with the actual application of force. It allows for the military 
commanders to select particular targets and decide how to deal with them. The US Joint 
Publication (JP) 1-02 defines targeting as: ―The process of selecting and prioritizing targets 
and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and 
capabilities‖.
247 
A decision to apply lethal force may be the result of this process, but a Counter Insurgency 
(COIN) Campaign like OEF would usually aim at minimising such use of force. The US Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24, issued in 2006, discusses COIN tactics, and particularly emphasises the 
necessity of minimising the use of force in order to ―win the people‖ rather than ―to beat the 
enemy‖.
248 Consequently, the targeting process may result in decisions ranging from 
increased surveillance and monitoring of particular targets to so-called capture operations 
aimed at apprehending individuals or, if the situation so requires, ultimately engage a target 
with lethal force. Both operational and legal considerations are emphasised throughout the 
process. In particular, each single target will be thoroughly checked against the provisions of 
International Law before its approval.  
As mentioned by Hannestad, the process of developing a Norwegian targeting policy 
gained speed spring 2002. The Norwegian Special Forces had already been deployed to 
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theatre for some time, but the covert nature of their operations has not allowed for analysis of 
their procedures. The Norwegian senior officials clearly indicated that the issue of targeting 
was highly emphasised in particular when planning for the Norwegian F-16 contribution.
249 
Col Hannestad confirms that whereas the initial Norwegian contributions mostly would 
require robust self-defence criteria, the F-16 contribution required a focus on developing a 
targeting policy hitherto unknown in Norway. In a note to the MoD in May 2002 on the issue 
of targeting in connection with the F-16 contribution, it is stated: ―We have limited national 
political-military competence on targeting issues, and we have no established procedures or a 
targeting organisation for handling the questions that may arise‖.
250 
When preparing for the Norwegian F-16 contribution, the MoD acknowledged that the 
Norwegian forces would have to rely heavily on US intelligence and the US targeting process. 
It would therefore be of vital importance that Norway had representatives in the OEF Chain of 
Command who had the qualifications needed to assess the quality and reliability of the US-
provided intelligence.
251 In practice, this was done either at the tactical level by on-scene 
commanders or by so called ―red-card holders‖ situated at various US in-theatre command 
posts.
252 Red-card holders were Norwegian officers handling the Norwegian policy 
throughout the operation. The red-card holder‘s main task was to ―do everything possible to 
assure that the targets were neither civilians nor civilian items, or were subject to particular 
protection, but were military targets‖.
253 The Norwegian representatives in connection with 
the F-16 contribution were planned to be situated in the US command posts conducting 
Command and Control over the OEF air assets, such as the Joint Task Force Headquarters at 
Bagram airfield north of Kabul.
254 According to Hannestad, the red-card holders received 
thorough briefings at the MoD on Norwegian policy, legal obligations and so on.
255 
Norwegian authorities could thus claim national control over important matters, such as when 
and under which circumstances Norwegian personnel were allowed to engage in case of 
hostilities. 
Both Frisvold and Hannestad indicated that the political authorities did not deem it 
necessary to have detailed political control over the selection of single targets, but that target 
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categories or target types would require some kind of political approval.
256 The target 
categories would have to be legitimate in respect of international law and in line with 
Norwegian policy. As an example of target categories was mentioned ―armed Al Qaeda and 
Taliban soldiers‖.
257 
Authorisation of engaging targets in any particular event was delegated to either 
Norwegian lower level commanders, to red-card holders situated at in-theatre command posts 
or, in some situations, the Chief of Defence.
258 General Frisvold recalls an episode where he 
was jogging on the outskirts of Oslo and received a phone call on his secure phone from the 
red-card holder at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan, requesting authorisation to apply force by 
Norwegian F-16s. After some considerations, he denied the request because it was assumed to 
be outside the agreed policy, even though the target it self was legally acceptable.
259 However, 
the actual decision would only exceptionally be brought back to Norway. The on-scene 
commanders and the red-card holders became those who, for all practical purposes, dealt with 
the issue of if and when Norwegian F-16s could use their weapons. 
To conclude on the Norwegian discussion and decision-making process on ROEs and 
targeting, this thesis asserts the following: 
  Norwegian authorities retained responsibility for Norwegian forces‘ activities. 
  Norwegian political authorities would authorise certain target categories eligible for 
engagement. 
  Norwegian policy would be handled on a day-to-day basis by red-card holders situated 
in US in-theatre command posts  
  Norwegian authorities would have a final approval on what targets could be engaged, 
mainly by the use of the red-card holders. 
  Norway applied to the US OEF ROEs, though with some restrictions imposed. 
  Engagement by Norwegian forces would require a positive identification of the 
enemy. 
  Hostile acts or intents were required in order for Norwegian forces to apply force. 
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Analysing the Norwegian process on ROEs and targeting 
This thesis asserts that in order to apply force outside the scope of self-defence against a non-
combatant, participation in hostilities is required. Whereas individuals belonging to the 
Taliban armed forces arguably could be targeted using a membership approach in the first 
phase of the conflict, non-state actors could not. International law requires that non-
combatants may be targeted only for the time they actually commit hostilities. The conceptual 
challenges with this are discussed in Section One. The issue of defining hostilities and active 
participation is instrumental in order to develop legally robust ROEs and targeting procedures. 
Consequently, analysing the Norwegian process on ROEs and targeting may be derived from 
the following two questions.  
  How was the issue of hostilities discussed in Norway, and did Norway define 
hostilities when addressing the issue of ROEs and targeting procedures?  
  The issue of ―for the time they actively participate‖ is of major importance in order to 
decide whether a non-combatant is targetable or not. To which extent was this issue on 
addressed in the Norwegian discussion and decision-making process?  
 
Defining hostilities 
As demonstrated in Section One, international law requires participation in hostilities in order 
to engage an opponent outside a membership approach. However, what constitutes hostilities 
may be a question of interpretation. International law does not provide clear guidance on this 
issue. It is consequently an issue that is left for states to decide, within the boundaries 
provided by various sources of law and state practice. 
The US and its NATO allies differentiate between direct attacks, hostile acts and 
hostile intents. I will in the following examine the military appreciation of these items, 
connect it to the Norwegian case and analyse it in connection with the law.  
A direct attack would usually justify an armed response based on the ―inherent‖ right 
to self-defence. A hostile act may typically be an act, not constituting a direct attack, which 
directly put an individual or unit in harm‘s way. An armed response to a hostile act would 
require ROEs authorising such a response. Since OEF was a US-led operation, I will in the 
following use US definitions, even though Norway would normally comply with NATO 
definitions as stated in the MC 362 document. 
According to the US Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, a 
hostile act is defined as:
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An attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces, and, in certain 
circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other 
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used 
directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the 
recovery of US personnel and vital US Government property.
 260  
Hostile intent is basically about the threat to use force, and would usually require both intent 
and ability. However, the causal connection between the activity and its possible harmful 
consequence is less clear. International law has no precise definition of hostile intent, but as 
discussed in Section One, it is generally assumed that the closer the perpetrator is to the 
―triggerman‖, the more likely it is to define his or her intentions as hostile. 
The US Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A defines hostile intent as: 
The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces, and in certain 
circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other 
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. Also, the threat of 
force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the 
recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.
261 
 
Neither a hostile act nor a hostile intent automatically implies that an individual becomes a 
target that may be dealt with forcefully. Except for cases of obvious self-defence, the 
application of force will be decided by an authorised commander in accordance with the 
established ROEs. It may further be of importance to distinguish between acts or intentions of 
hostility and acts of crime. Application of military force against the latter will be lawful only 
insofar as law enforcement resources are inadequate, and that the military effort is conducted 
in support of and in conjunction with law enforcement requirements.  
This thesis asserts that the above definitions provide some clarity as to what may 
constitute hostilities. However, the Afghan conflict provides a variety of examples of 
activities that do not fit easily into the rather broad definitions above. In Section One, the 
issue of proximity to the ―triggerman‖ is discussed. It is doubtful whether the above 
definitions provide sufficient clarity as to how close an individual needs to be to the 
―triggerman‖ in order to be assessed as participating in hostilities.
262 It could consequently be 
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DPH in IHL, pp.1020–1022.   87 
expected that states provided further clarification on the definition of hostilities when 
developing ROEs and targeting procedures.  
To what extent did Norwegian authorities discuss the content of the phrase 
―hostilities‖ and did it influence the development of ROEs?  
Col Hannestad stated that Norwegian forces could only use force as a response to a 
hostile act.
263 He did not recall that Norway developed a national policy on what would 
constitute a hostile act, the logical consequence of which would be that Norway complied 
with the US definitions. The detailed interpretation of what constituted hostile acts was for 
most practical purposes left to Norwegian in-theatre representatives, such as the red-card 
holders. According to Frisvold, Norway emphasised developing ROEs and targeting 
procedures that would assure that Norwegian forces use of force were in accordance with 
Norwegian policy and obligations, but did not discuss any in-depth definitions of hostile acts 
or intents.
264 
The issue of whether hostile intent was deemed sufficient for targeting seems to have 
been addressed by the Defence Staff and the MoD. Again, it is difficult to assess the precise 
content of the phrase ―hostile intent‖. General Frisvold indicated that in connection with the 
Special Forces contribution, the Military asked for and received approval for the view that 
hostile intent was sufficient for use of force, including lethal force.
265 He did not indicate 
whether this was in situations of self-defence only, or if hostile intent itself was sufficient for 
defining a target as hostile outside the scope of self-defence. The latter appreciation would 
thus have allowed for an individual to be targeted at the choice of OEF forces. Frisvold again 
indicated that his main aim was to get robust ROEs and targeting procedures that did not 
hamper military operations or endanger Norwegian units or personnel. According to Frisvold, 
this was perfectly understood at the political level and the Military ―got the ROEs they 
needed‖.
266 
Whereas it seems that the issue of defining hostility was not widely discussed, the 
issue of target categories attracted some attention. Target categories are generally not 
specified, but MoD documents clarify that target categories must be ―legitimate military 
targets‖. As an example of a target category, one document mentions: ―Armed Al 
Qaeda/Taliban soldiers‖.
267 This is to some extent related to the issue of defining hostilities 
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because it would allow for engaging certain categories of individuals or installations, if those 
individuals otherwise satisfied the conditions of being classified as hostile. As discussed 
above, Norwegian authorities did not seem to distinguish between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 
either from an operational or legal perspective. Neither Frisvold nor Hannestad indicate an 
appreciation of Taliban and Al Qaeda as separate entities requiring individual procedures. In a 
note to the Defence Minister, the issue of targeting procedures and ROE‘s was discussed.
268 It 
discusses the necessity of politically approved target categories. The document does not 
reveal or discuss actual ROEs, but indicates the challenges that must be met by those ROEs.  
The document states that the political level need to approve certain target categories, 
but that the actual target designation within those already approved categories did not require 
political endorsement. The reference to ―target categories‖ was repeated in a MoD note to the 
meeting of the Governmental Security Committee on the 20
th of June 2002.
269 If ―Armed Al 
Qaeda/Taliban soldiers‖ were defined as a target category, one would expect that the ROEs 
allowed for their engagement or capture. Without detailed insight in the actual ROEs, the 
issue is difficult to address. However, from the perspective of international law, this 
categorisation raises at least one significant issue. By the time these documents were written, 
the conflict was still perceived as an international armed conflict. Taliban soldiers could 
consequently be targeted by a membership approach, whereas Al Qaeda operatives could not. 
Al Qaeda operatives could only be targeted for the time ―they were directly participating in 
hostilities‖. It may consequently be argued that from the perspective of international law, 
Taliban soldiers may be categorised as a ―target category‖ in the initial phase, whereas it is 
questionable whether international law allows for such categorisation of a non-state actor like 
Al Qaeda. Available sources suggest that this issue was not addressed. From the establishment 
of the interim administration in June 2002, the Taliban would no longer be assumed to 
represent a state entity and would consequently be categorised as non-state actors no different 
from Al Qaeda operatives. From this point in time, also targeting the Taliban would require a 
sufficiently clear connection to their participation in hostilities.  
The use of target categories indicates a membership approach. In non- international 
conflicts where the opposition is not combatants, i.e. civilians, their targetability depends on 
their direct participation in hostilities, not by belonging to certain and possibly identifiable 
groups. The issues of military necessity and proportionality will clearly influence the 
targetability of certain targets also in non-international conflicts. However, the threshold for 
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applying force outside the scope of combating individuals or groups of individuals directly 
participating in hostilities must be assumed to be higher in non-international than in 
international armed conflicts. It may consequently be questioned to which extent the use of 
target categories in this case is feasible insofar as it is not connected to a viable definition of 
hostility. 
Statements from military and MoD officials and discussions in MoD documents 
indicate a pragmatic approach to these issues. A finely tuned judicial approach that 
distinguished between the Taliban and Al Qaeda could hamper operational freedom, thus 
reducing the forces‘ ability to act purposefully. Defining certain target categories as eligible 
for engagement would obviously ease the decision-making process, a process that would 
frequently require swift decisions. As the previous discussion demonstrates, there was an 
almost complete unanimity within the political community and the bureaucracy of the 
necessity to support the US and OEF. This may, at least partially, explain that finely tuned 
judicial assessments were not perceived as necessary as long as Norwegian use of force was 
assumed not to violate Norwegian obligations or policy. 
To conclude the discussion on defining hostilities, this thesis asserts the following.  
  Norwegian units were committed to Norwegian law and the country‘s international 
obligations, also when those rules and obligations contradicted those of the lead 
nation, being the US. 
  The Norwegian discussion and decision-making process mainly focused on 
developing a suitable process for handling ROEs and targeting procedures process. 
  Norway agreed on specific target categories as being eligible for engagement. Target 
categories should be in accordance with Norway‘s policy and international 
obligations.  
  A positive identification of individuals or groups of individuals was necessary before 
use of force was acceptable.  
  Norway did not distinguish between Taliban and Al Qaeda for operational purposes. 
  Available sources suggest that defining hostilities was not addressed within the 
Norwegian process. The definitions applied by the US would consequently apply also 
for Norwegian units. 
  Handling Norwegian policy was in most instances left to Norwegian in-theatre 
representatives, such as the red-card holders. 
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For the time they participate 
The next issue is the Norwegian discussion of for the time they participate. Section One 
particularly addresses the so-called revolving door problem; individuals partly participating in 
hostilities and partly carrying on with their normal civilian life. As discussed in Section One, 
the revolving door problem is one of substantial interest when addressing the use of force and 
non-state actors. Non-state actors will in most cases have the status of civilians, thus not being 
targetable by a membership approach. This thesis argues that the targeting of such individuals 
outside the scope of self-defence would require a definition or appreciation of ―for the time 
they participate‖. To which extent was this an issue in the Norwegian discussion and decision-
making process? 
It is possible to foresee a situation where Norwegian F-16s would be called to attack a 
target that had been perceived to represent a direct threat to ground forces, but were 
withdrawing by the time the aircraft were in position to release its weapons. A narrow 
approach to the issue of DPH would not allow for engagement, whereas a wider approach 
would permit engagement based on the assumption that the withdrawing forces could 
constitute a future threat.
270 Apparently, this issue was not addressed in any depth within the 
Norwegian decision-making process.  
The Norwegian MoD did not provide definitions or guidance of for the time they 
participate.
271 According to Hemmer, the limitations were assumed to be taken care of 
through the targeting process ―based on international law, ROEs, SPINS etc‖.
272 General 
Frisvold did not indicate that any efforts were taken within the military leadership in order to 
develop guidance on the matter. Frisvold‘s comments indicate that the military was not too 
concerned with this issue and mainly saw it as a judicial and political matter. This coincides 
with Hannestad, who pointed out that most decisions regarding use of force were left to the 
in-theatre representatives, based on their knowledge of Norwegian operational capacities, 
Norwegian policy and legal obligations. Hannestad indicated that there may have been an 
issue of immediacy with respect to whether an armed response could be justified. Hannestad 
further stated that the Norwegian F-16s main task was to be on airborne alert positions, using 
their weapons as a response to a situation requiring urgent response. There are no indications 
that the Norwegian F-16s participated in pre-planned offensive engagements. It may 
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consequently be argued that Norwegian use of force in most cases would fall under the self-
defence paradigm. However, it is questionable whether the actual modus operandi of OEF 
would remove the requirement of defining ―for the time they participate‖.  
Evidence suggests that no national policy on ―for the time they participate‖ was 
developed, nor that the issue was addressed at any depth within the MoD or with the 
Norwegian red-card holders. It consequently seems that the issue was left almost entirely to 
the red-card holders for interpretation. This thesis thus argues that the issue of ―the time they 
participate‖ was not addressed in any depth within the Norwegian discussion, and was 
consequently no factor in the decision-making process as to Norwegian forces‘ use of force. 
 
 
Conclusion, Section Two 
Whereas Section One provides the conceptual framework of the use of armed force against 
non-state actors, Section Two examines the Norwegian perception of contemporary conflicts 
and the legal aspects of the Norwegian support to the US and participation in Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  
The Norwegian post-Second World War history with respect to the use of force have 
predominantly been focused on either the defence of Norway in case of a supreme emergency, 
or UN-led, so-called blue-helmet operations. The Norwegian participation in Operation Allied 
Force in 1999, and in particular Operation Enduring Freedom, marked a departure from this 
tradition. This thesis argues that by September 2001, the Norwegian perception of war was 
predominantly that of a major conflict between states, not the fragmented battlefield of 
Afghanistan or similar conflicts. The supreme emergency represented by the possible 
scenarios of the Cold War was still at the core of Norwegian defence planning, as for example 
the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine of 2000 demonstrates. However, both the military 
and political leadership were cognisant of the particularities posed by the 9/11 attack and the 
consequent US attack on Afghanistan, though there was a general reluctance to term the 
conflict war.  
As demonstrated in Section Two, Norwegian politicians made several statements that 
indicated a perception of the complexity of the Afghan conflict. Military means was 
mentioned as one of many means that could be used in order to solve the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban problem. It thus seems clear that already by autumn 2001, Norwegian politicians did 
not foresee a pure military solution for Afghanistan.    92 
Neither the political leadership nor the bureaucracy or the military leadership indicated 
that there were controversies or disagreements regarding the legal issues of the Norwegian 
participation in OEF. The US claimed that the 9/11 attack was an act of aggression. This view 
was supported by the Norwegian Government and a vast majority in Parliament. The public 
discussion, as it appeared in Norwegian newspapers, indicated a widespread support for the 
US and the right to respond against the attackers. Some critical voices were raised, 
predominantly by representatives of the legal academic communities and representatives of 
the political left. However, these objections did not gain substantial support, and remained an 
exception throughout the timeframe discussed by this thesis. 
This thesis argues that the Afghan conflict in its initial phase partly qualified as an 
international and partly a non-international armed conflict, whereas it qualified solely as a 
non-international armed conflict in its second phase. The Norwegian position was arguably 
that it qualified as an international armed conflict in its initial phase and changed status to a 
non-international armed conflict after the establishment of the interim Government in June 
2002. Dividing it into two legally distinct conflicts was not addressed and as a consequence, 
Norway did not distinguish operationally or legally between the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  
Both Frisvold and Krohn Devold stated that developing ROEs and targeting procedures were 
emphasised in the autumn of 2001 in connection with the initial force contributions. However, 
other sources, like the MoD archives, suggest that developing suitable ROEs and targeting 
procedures first gained momentum by the spring of 2002 in connection with the planning of 
the Norwegian F-16 contribution. Norway emphasised developing robust ROEs that would 
allow for seamless integration with the US. In principle, OEF ROEs and targeting procedures 
were accepted by Norway, though with some national restrictions imposed so as not to violate 
Norwegian policy or legal obligations.  
The particularities of using military force against non-state actors with respect to 
defining hostilities and DPH were not addressed in any depth. The issue was supposed to be 
dealt with by Norwegian red-card holders or in-theatre commanders based on their knowledge 
of Norwegian policy and operational necessity.  
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Summary, conclusion and closing remarks 
 
This thesis argues that whereas the international legal system covering international armed 
conflicts is well developed, non-international armed conflicts do not boast similar attention.  
As a result, the predominant contemporary conflicts are not covered by a comprehensive legal 
regime. In addition, the legal regime covering non-international conflicts does not have the 
same universal legitimacy as for example the GC I –IV. The lack of a comprehensive legal 
regime allows for a wider interpretation of the rules based on state interest, as the US position 
with respect to the status of Taliban soldiers and Al Qaeda operatives demonstrates.  
When Norway decided to support the US by a military contribution to OEF, it was clear that 
this would not be a peace support operation under the auspices of the UN. As such the 
participation deviated substantially from the post 2 WW experiences of the Norwegian 
military and what was commonly assumed to be the Norwegian approach, the so called UN 
track. In addition, the Afghan conflict did not compare to the general perception of war in 
Norway. It was a new type of conflict, to which Norway had highly limited experience. 
Consequently, Norway‘s participation in OEF required an appreciation of major issues 
connected to the application of law and the use of force that previously had not been 
addressed in any depth in Norway.  
Hence, the core issues to be examined by this thesis were: 
1.  The major issues of legality related to the application of military force against non-
state actors, hence providing a normative framework that may serve as a basis for 
further analysis. 
2.  The impact and relevance of law in the Norwegian discussion and decision-making 
process prior to and during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom 
 
In Section One, the major issues of legality connected to the application of force 
against non-state actors is discussed. Initially, the thesis clarifies that the general provisions 
for the legal use of force, in particular by addressing the provisions relevant to non-
international armed conflicts. It argues that claiming self defence against non-state actors, as 
were the case of the US vs. Al Qaeda, is a matter of some controversy. Recent state practice 
and evolution within international law indicate that non-state actors may conduct acts of 
aggression, thus justifying a state‘s armed response against the actors in question. Such a 
perception opens for, at least in theory, the existence of an armed conflict between a state and 
a non-state actor, a view substantially supported by the UNSC resolutions 1368 and 1373. US   94 
statements after the 9/11 incident indicate that this was the US position towards Al Qaeda. 
This thesis argues that the use of armed force against non-state actors are mainly connected to 
the issues of acts of aggression, classification of the conflict, status of the actors and their 
identification, and finally the issue of targeting.  It argues that use of armed force against non-
state actors is lawful only insofar as it is connected to the conduct of hostilities. However, the 
preconditions set by international law for non-state actors to be perceived as a party to an 
armed conflict, hence allow for a membership approach, does not fit the particularities of the 
Afghan theatre.  As such, targeting Al Qaeda operatives is lawful only insofar as they take 
direct part in hostilities. Consequently, this thesis argues that the key questions are to identify 
criteria for defining hostilities and ―for the time they participate‖. The current legal regime 
does not provide precise definitions for either of these issues. As the case stands, the ICRC 
interpretive guidance argues in favour of a far less permissive practice than what is current 
state practise in e.g. the Afghan conflict.
273  
In section two, the thesis examines the impact and relevance of law in the Norwegian 
discussion and decision making process. It argues that even though the issue of international 
law was highly visible in the Norwegian public discussion, it was not a substantial part of the 
decision-making process. Based on the examination above, it suggests that there are three 
main reasons why this was not the case: 
First, understanding the changing character of war: The issue of the changing character 
of war is important because it relates to the understanding of law in armed conflicts. If the 
Norwegian perception of war did not allow for the Norwegian participation in OEF to be 
termed war, that could create serious challenges as to which legal regime should be applied. 
Statements from Government officials and leading politicians suggest some appreciation of 
the particularities of the Afghan conflict, but not a deeper understanding of how those 
particularities would connect to law. 
Second, the factors of time and unanimity: The process of dealing with the Afghan 
conflict and preparing military capacities to the US efforts were subject to considerable time 
pressure. The time factor, combined with the obvious political momentum to support the US, 
did not allow for finely tuned judicial assessments. In addition, the almost complete unanimity 
between the various actors of the decision-making process added to the appreciation that 
finely tuned judicial assessments were not necessary.  
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Third, the issue of pragmatism: Norwegian decision-makers had no doubt that OEF 
was legal, and that Norway was obliged to support the US militarily. Since Norway was a 
minor contributor, developing a national set of rules for the application of force would be 
highly complicated. If the Norwegian rules and procedures departed too much from those of 
the US, Norway would hardly be welcomed into the coalition. Statements from Government 
officials suggest that this must have been assessed as contradictory to Norwegian interests. 
This thesis asserts that the development of a Norwegian ROE and targeting process thus 
concentrated on examining the US regulations, and be assured that they did not depart too 
much from what otherwise would be Norwegian policy. Apart from less permissive targeting 
procedures, there are no indications that the Norwegian procedures departed substantially 
from those of the US.  
This thesis concludes that, even though law played a substantial rhetorical role, neither 
the Norwegian discussion nor the decision-making process addressed the issue of applying 
military force against non-state actors in the Afghan conflict in any depth. The rhetorical 
focus did not translate into a thorough examination of the particular issues that derive from 
such use of force. Norway did not distinguish operationally between the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda in the conflict‘s initial phase, it did not make an in-depth analysis of the status of the 
actors and it did not develop a national policy for defining hostilities or DPH. Evidence 
suggests that Norway did not address in any depth the provisions of GC I – IV article 3, GC 
additional protocol II or other sources of law relevant to the Afghan theatre. Neither did 
Norway develop a national policy on how to deal with these provisions. The policy and 
procedures of the US were, with some exceptions, accepted by Norway.   
The political debate since the 2001 decision to support OEF has not moved 
substantially on the matter of law. It is widely acknowledged that the Afghan conflict 
qualifies as a non-international armed conflict, but the political leadership seems to make a 
distinction between armed conflict and war, still reserving the latter term for international 
armed conflicts.
274  The Norwegian position on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance is not known, 
but current practise in the Afghan conflicts suggests that Norway concur to the ISAF ROE 
and targeting procedures, thus applying a more permissive policy than the recommended by 
ICRC.
275 The Norwegian military contribution to ISAF is widely recognised throughout the 
political establishment and, apart from some objections put forward by the Socialist Party, has 
unanimous support in Parliament. The particular issues of law addressed in this thesis remains 
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almost absent in the public and political discussion; hence the particularities of the Afghan 
conflict with respect to IHL are still an area that would benefit from political and public 
attention. 
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Acronyms: 
 
Acronym  Meaning  Explanation 
CIMIC  Civil Military Cooperation   
COIN  Counter Insurgency   
DoD  Department of Defence   
DPH  Directly Participating in Hostilities   
GC  Geneva Conventions   
HRL  Human Rights Law   
ICC  International Criminal Court   
ICJ  International Court of Justice   
ICRC  International Committee of the 
Red Cross 
 
IDF  Israeli Defence Force   
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
 
 
IRA  Irish Republican Army   
ISAF  International Security Assistance 
Force 
 
ISI  Inter-Services Intelligence  Pakistani Military intelligence Service 
LOAC  Law of Armed Conflict   
MC  NATO Military Committee   
MoD  Minister of Defence   
MP  Member of Parliament   
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation   
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom 
 
 
POW  Prisoner of War   
PRIO  Peace Research Institute Oslo   
ROE  Rules of Engagement   
SPINS  Special Instructions  Explanatory or supplementary amendments to 
the document‘s main body. Used in military 
orders and ROE documents 
UK  United Kingdom   
UN   United Nations   
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly   
UNSC  United Nations Security Council   
US  United States of America   
VG  Verdens Gang  Newspaper 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction   
4GW  Forth Generation Warfare   
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